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REGULATING RISK NOT FUNCTION
Heidi Mandanis Schooner*
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1920s, my ninety-two-year-old grandmother has invested
her savings in bank' accounts. Over the last decade, she has decried the
declining interest rates on her bank certificates of deposit (CDs), but has
never changed her investment strategy. Since the 1950s, my mother has
invested her savings in securities products, insurance products, and a
significant portion in a bank account-despite very low interest
rates-because "you might need cash in an emergency." Today, my
modest savings are invested in securities and insurance products. I keep
a minimal balance in a bank account-just enough to pay the mortgage
and other monthly bills. In an emergency, I would use my credit card.
This brief genealogy illustrates the disintermediation2 that has
plagued the banking industry for the last twenty years. In 1995,
aggregate mutual fund holdings surpassed bank deposits for the first
time in history. In June of 1996, insured commercial bank deposits
stood at $2.6 trillion, while assets held in mutual funds totaled $3.2
trillion.3 Americans have become more sophisticated investors, more
willing to take risk, or simply unwilling to accept meager returns on
bank deposits.4 Rather than succumbing to obsolescence, banks have
responded by venturing beyond the traditional bank deposit to
providing their customers with securities and insurance products.5
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America.
I would like to thank Bert Ely, Ely & Co.; Michael Taylor, Reading University; Patrick McCarty, FDIC;
Donald Lamson, OCC; Sarah Miller, ABA; and Lawrence Pierce, FDIC, for their time and assistance in
gathering sources for this Article. Special thanks to Steven Schooner and Robert Rosenblum for their
cheerful willingness to read drafts and debate issues. I am grateful to Stephanie Leger for her energetic
research assistance. The views expressed in this Article are my own and do not represent those of any of
the above-listed individuals, agencies, or institutions.
1. The term "bank" is used to refer only to commercial banks offering insured deposits and not to
savings associations and credit unions.
2. The term "disintermediation" refers to the flow of money out of bank deposits and into other
investments, such as mutual funds. See Gary W. Lorenz, Electrunw Stord Value Payment Systems, Market Position,
and Regulatory Issues, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1195-97 (1997); ROBERT L TORTORIELLO, GUIDE TO
BANK UNDERWRrriNG, DEALNG, AND BROKERAGE AcTIVrnES 1-18 (1997). The term also refers to the
elimination of financial intermediaries, such as banks or brokers, from financial transactions. &e geraly
Thomas W. Cashel, Financial Seics: Scurity, Privacy, and Enyption, 3 B.U.J. Sci. & TECH. L 4 (1997).
3. GAO, Mutal Funds: SECAdjusted Its Oerightin AuponsetoRapidlnhuby Grobth, GAO/GGD-97-
67, at 3 (May 1997).
4. In 1989, 19% of U.S. families held bank certificates of deposit (CDs) and 7% owned mutual
funds. By 1992, 17% of families held CDs and 11% owned mutual funds. See TORTORIELL, supra note
2.
5. For a comprehensive discussion of banks' securities activities, see TORTORIEILO, supra note 2.
For a comprehensive discussion of national banks' insurance activities, see Guidance to National Banks on
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Federal banking laws, however, restrict banks' ability to venture far
beyond traditional banking business.6 With respect to securities
activities, legislation from the 1930s restricts significantly a bank's ability
to engage in the securities business.7 Consensus opinion suggests,
however, that banks must be given the opportunity to expand beyond
their traditional activities to compete with the non-bank financial firms
that continue to erode their customer base. Recently, banking
regulators have taken bold steps to increase banks' securities powers.8
Today, Congress is considering legislation that would allow further bank
infiltration into the securities markets.9
The modernization of the business of banking will impact
dramatically the fundamental structure of bank regulation. °
Recognizing this, proposals for reform of restrictions on banks' securities
activities have also addressed the need for structural change. Current
reform proposals focus on a functional model of regulation, i.e., a model
in which the scope of regulation is determined by function or product."
Put simply, the functional model provides that securities products should
be regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under
federal securities laws' 2 and banking products should be regulated by the
federal bank regulators 3 under federal banking laws.' 4 The functional
model is contrasted with the institutional or entity model, which divides
regulation according to institution or entity. The institutional model
provides that banks should be regulated under the banking laws by bank
regulators and securities firms should be regulated under the securities
Inswrance andAnnuiy SaksA'Acdui, 1996 OCC CB LEXIS 101, AL 96-8 (Oct. 8,1996); Troy Cichos, Small
Towns, Large Stakes: New Battles Over Bank Insurance Saki Under the National Bank Act, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 651
(1995).
6. Seegmer/vJulie L Williams & Mark P.Jacobsen, The Business of Banking: Looking to the Fure, 50
BUS. LAw. 783 (1995) (discussing generally restrictions on national banks' activities).
7. See Part I (discussing restrictions on banks' securities activities).
8. See infra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
9. See infta note 199.
10. The term "regulation" is used, unless otherwise indicated, to refer generically to agencies'
rulemaking authority, supervisory authority (i.e., their ability to monitor and examine banks' practices and
operations), and enforcement authority (i.e., their ability to bring civil, criminal, or administrative
proceedings to enforce laws).
11. See inyra Part III for a discussion of the functional regulation model.
12. The term "federal securities laws" is used to refer to the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
These statutes are discussed in detail in Part II of this Article.
13. The terms "federal bank regulators" or "federal bank agencies" are used to refer to the Board
of Governors for the Federal Reserve System (Fed), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC),
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), unless otherwise indicated.
14. The term "federal banking laws" is used to refer to the National Bank Act, the Bank Holding
Company Act, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as each of those laws have been amended from time
to time.
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laws by the SEC. Our current system operates substantially on a
functional basis. To the extent that current legislative proposals for
reform rely on the functional model, they do not provide for much
change from the status quo.
The twenty-first century will demand real change rather than
adjustments to an antiquated regulatory regime. The functional
regulatory model will not prove effective in the consolidated,
international, and technologically-advanced financial markets of the
future. This Article contends that a more appropriate model for the
future should be risk based, focusing on the risks that we seek to regulate
through the laws affecting finance. Under a risk based model, the
breadth of laws and the division of regulatory responsibility is
determined by the risk to be regulated, i.e., bank insurance fund risk,
systemic risk, and risk of unfairness. A risk based model, because it does
not depend on product or entity definitions, can abide the development
of new products through technological advances and other market
innovations, and the changes in the character of financial institutions
through consolidation. Moreover, because the risk based model focuses
directly on the purpose of financial regulation, it proves more effective
and efficient than the current system.
This Article examines our current scheme of bank regulation through
an analysis of banks' securities activities -- how such activities are
currently regulated and how they might be regulated in the future. Part
I summarizes the major restrictions on banks' securities activities,
emphasizing recent regulatory initiatives aimed toward expanding
banks' participation in the securities business. Part II examines the
application of the federal securities laws to banks' securities activities.
(While banks enjoy some exemptions from the federal securities laws,
they are subject to many of the most important provisions.) In addition,
Part II sets forth the division of responsibility for administering the
securities laws among the federal banking regulators and the SEC.
Part III analyzes the current paradigm of regulation of banks'
securities activities and concludes that the current model combines
elements of functional and institutional regulation in form. Yet, once
actual bank securities activities are taken into consideration, the current
model more closely resembles functional regulation and, therefore, can
be designated "the functional equivalent to functional regulation." Part
IV evaluates the current model of regulation of banks' securities
15. The term "banks' securities activities" is used broadly to refer to activities relating to a bank's
own stock and a bank's involvement in the securities business. Unless otherwise indicated, the term refers
to activities that take place within the bank itself, within a bank subsidiary, or a bank affiliate. This Article
does not attempt to address similar issues relating to banks' expansion into insurance activities.
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activities using the conventional understanding of the goals of the federal
banking laws and the federal securities laws. This Part concludes that,
given the current dimensions of actual bank securities activities, the
incumbent model provides an acceptable compromise between the
benefits of the functional model and those of the institutional model.
Part V considers the durability of our current system of regulation and
proposals for reform which seek only to provide more pure functional
regulation. Part V concludes that the current model will not endure in
an era of expanded bank securities activities and financial market
consolidation. Part V contends that a system of regulation which is
divided by risk is better suited to the financial markets of the future.
I. RESTRICTIONS ON BANKS' SECURITIES ACTIVITIES:
GLASS-STEAGALL
In 1933, Congress enacted the Glass-Steagall Act (Glass-Steagall) 6 for
the purpose of "ensuring the stability of banks and protecting bank de-
positors."' 7 To this day, Glass-Steagall contains the major restrictions 8
on banks' securities activities. Section 16 of Glass-Steagall provides:
The business of dealing in securities and stock by [national banks]
shall be limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock
without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of,
customers, and in no case for its own account, and [national banks]
shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock: Provided, That
[a national bank] may purchase for its own account investment
securities under such limitations and restrictions as the Comptroller
of the Currency may by regulation prescribe.'
9
16. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 227 (1996)).
17. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Clarke, 885 F.2d 1034, 1051-52 (2d Cir. 1989). The purpose is not
investor protection, which is the focus of the federal securities laws. Se id Moreover, the goal of the
legislation was not simply to limit a bank's ability to make risky investments. The Supreme Court has
identified certain "subtle hazards" that the Glass-Steagall Act (Glass-Steagall) was intended to address.
Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971). For example, the legislation was intended to preserve
the public's confidence in banks and banks' "ability to function as an impartial source of credit." Id. at 631.
18. Other provisions of the banking laws could also limit banks' securities activities; one example
is the banking laws' general prohibition on unsafe or unsound banking practices. Se 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)
(1996). Because of the comprehensive nature of Glass-Steagall, other sources of limitations of bank
securities activities are not generally the focus of attention or discussion.
19. It § 24 (seventh). The § 16 restrictions are also applicable to state member banks. See id § 335.
Section 16 does not apply to state nonmember banks. Section 21 of Glass-Steagall, however, is applicable
to state nonmember banks, see infta notes 2-4 and accompanying text, providing many of the same
restrictions. Section 21, however, does not restrict banks' investments in securities. Therefore, until the
passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), state
nonmember banks had more flexibility in their securities investments. FDICIA imposed on state
nonmember banks the same investment limitations as are applicable to national banks. See id. § 183 Ia.
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Section 16 prohibits a national bank from most underwriting.
Nonetheless, by permitting the purchase or sale of securities "solely
upon the order, and for the account of, customers," § 16 allows banks
to engage in securities brokerage.2" In addition, underwriting,
purchases, and sales of "investment securities" are permitted.2'
Investment securities include certain federal, state, and municipal
government securities."
Glass-Steagall not only restricts the activities of banks, but separates
the business of commercial banking from investment banking.23 Section
21 of Glass-Steagall prohibits any firm "engaged in the business of
issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing" securities from also
engaging in the deposit-taking business.2" The Glass-Steagall separation
of commercial and investment banking is not drawn along corporate
entity lines. Section 20 of Glass-Steagall prohibits member banks (i.e.,
national banks and state member banks) from affiliating with any firm
"engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or
distribution" of securities. 25 Progressive interpretation of§ 20 has been
the source of much of the recent growth of banks' securities activities.
In 1987, the Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve System
(Fed) approved an application by Citicorp, J.P. Morgan, and Bankers
Trust to create a non-bank subsidiary-commonly referred to as a "§ 20
subsidiary"-of a bank holding company that would be permitted to
underwrite commercial paper, municipal revenue bonds, and mortgage
backed securities. 26 The Fed's approval was based on an interpretation
of the "engaged principally" language found in § 20. The Fed
determined that the § 20 subsidiary would not be engaged principally in
underwriting securities if the underwriting of bank-ineligible securities
was limited to five percent of the subsidiaries' gross revenues, and the
activities with regard to bank ineligible securities did not constitute more
than five percent of the market for any type of security. In addition, the
20. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207 (1984)
(discount brokerage permissible); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
821 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (full service brokerage permissible).
21. See 12 C.F.R. § 1 (1997) (investment securities regulation).
22. See id The securities that a national bank can underwrite, purchase, or sell pursuant to § 16 of
Glass-Steagall are often referred to as "bank-eligible" securities.
23. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors ofthe Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 147-48
(1984); Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 70 (1981).
24. 12 U.S.C. § 378. This provision applies to all banks (i.e., national banks, state member banks,
and state nonmember banks) and securities firms.
25. Id § 377. In addition, § 32 of Glass-Steagall prohibits certain management interlocks between
member banks and firms "primarily engaged in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or
distribution" of securities. Ida § 78.
26. See 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473 (1987).
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Fed imposed certain "firewalls" to address safety and soundness issues
and potential conflicts of interest." The Second Circuit upheld the
Fed's interpretation but eliminated the market share limitation.28
In the years since the first approval, the Fed has incrementally
liberalized its interpretation of permissible activities for § 20 subsidiaries.
In 1989, the Fed approved the underwriting of debt and equity securities
for § 20 subsidiaries.29 The Fed increased the revenue limitation, first
from five to ten percent,3" and then, in 1996, from ten to twenty-five
percent.3' In 1997, the Fed eliminated most of the firewalls originally
imposed on § 20 subsidiary activities.32
Not to be outdone by the Fed, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) recently adopted a controversial rule governing the
activities of operating subsidiaries of national banks (commonly known
as the "op-sub rule").33 Most importantly, the op-sub rule provides that
a national bank may, assuming compliance with certain procedures and
safeguards, acquire or establish a subsidiary that would engage in
activities which would not be permissible for the bank itself3"
The Fed's liberalization of its regulations governing § 20 subsidiaries
of bank holding companies and the OCC's op-sub rule achieve a
manner of regulatory modernization of the banking industry beyond
even recent imagination. The industry reacted swiftly to take advantage
of these new opportunities. In April of 1997, Banker's Trust New York
Corp. announced that it was purchasing Alex. Brown & Sons Inc.,3 5 and
27. The "firewalls" were imposed not under Glass-Steagall, but undcr§ 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding
Company Act which restricts bank holding company activities and investments to those that are "so closely
related to banking." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1996). For a detailed description of the Fed's firewalls, see
TORTORIELLO, supra note 2, at Appendix B.
28. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board ofGovemors ofthe Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.
1988).
29. See 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192 (1989).
30. See 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 771 (1989).
31. See 61 Fed. Reg. 68,750 (1996).
32. See 62 Fed. Reg. 45,295 (1997) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
33. See 61 Fed. Reg. 60,342 (1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 5, 7, 16, and 28). For a
discussion of industry reaction to the rule, see AlfredJ.T. Bryne, FinandalModernization: Maybe Congress Wdl
Just Let It Happen, Am. BANKER, May 16, 1997, at 3; William Isaac, OCC Rule on Subsidiares Is Sound Public
Policy, AM. BANKER, Dec. 19, 1996), at 5; Bert Ely, New OCC Rue May Trigger a Wave of Sweeping Changes,
AM. BANKER, Dec. 11, 1996, at 4. No doubt anticipating legal debate over the rule, the OCC published
a memorandum outlining the Comptroller's legal authority to adopt the rule. See Memorandum fromJulie
L. Williams, Chief Counsel, to Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency (Nov. 18, 1996) (CCH
Federal Banking Law Reports 90-464).
34. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(l) (1997). The rule provides for notice and comment when the activity has
not before been approved by the OCC. See id. § 5.34()(l). The subsidiary must comply with certain
corporate separateness requirements, see id. § 5.34(1)(2), and supervisory requirements, see id. § 5.34(0(3).
35. See Niamh Ring, WeddingAnnounenentfor Bankers Trust andAkx. Brown Peases te Sbret, THE BOND
BUYER, Apr. 8, 1997, at 5.
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on July 21, 1997, the Fed announced approval of the transaction.36
Other bank holding companies quickly followed suit.
3 7
The OCC's op-sub is also likely to spur important changes in the
banking and securities industries. It is widely believed that the rule will
enable national banks, among other things, to engage in expanded
securities activities through their own subsidiaries rather than having to
rely on the bank holding-company affiliate approach (and, Fed
supervision). The OCC approved recently an application by a national
bank for an operating subsidiary to engage in underwriting and dealing
in securities of states and their political subdivisions. 8
II. APPLICATION OF THE SECURITIES LAWS TO BANKS'
SECURITIES ACTIVITIES
Subject to Glass-Steagall restrictions, banks engage in various
activities involving securities. Because banks are subject to a
comprehensive regulatory regime,39 banks are exempt from some
important provisions of the securities laws. On the other hand, many
key provisions of the securities laws apply to banks. Moreover, the
exemptions enjoyed by banks are not generally extended to bank
holding companies or non-bank subsidiaries or affiliates of banks.
Therefore, the application of the federal securities laws will depend on
whether the securities activity is conducted by the bank itself as opposed
to a bank subsidiary, non-bank affiliate of a bank, or bank holding
company.
A. Regulation of the Security
Congress has passed various laws that regulate transactions involving
securities-from the original issuance of the security to purchases and
36. See In re Bankers Trust New York Corporation, New York, New York, Order Approving Notice
to Engage in Nonbanking Activities, Federal Reserve Press Release (July 21, 1997).
37. On May 15, 1997, Swiss Bank Corp. announced its acquisition of Dillon, Read & Co. See
Niamh Ring, Swiss Bank to Acquire Dillon Read, Fate of Municipal Diiion Is Unclear, THE BOND BUYER, May
16, 1997, at 1. On July 28, 1997, the Fed approved this acquisition. See In re Swiss Bank Corporation,
Basel, Switzerland, Order Approving Notice to Engage In Nonbanking Activities, Federal Reserve Press
Release (July 28, 1997). OnJune 30, 1997, NationsBank Corp. announced its acquisition of Montgomery
Securities. SeeJill Dutt, NationsBank to Buy Brokerage, THE WASHINGTON POST,July 1, 1997, at C2. On
September 10, 1997, the Fed approved this acquisition. See In re NationsBank Corp., Order Approving
Notice to Engage in Certain Nonbanking Activities, Federal Reserve Press Release (Sept. 10, 1997).
38. See Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency on the Application by Zions First National
Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah to Commence New Activities in an Operating Subsidiary, 1997 OCC Ltr.
LEXIS 127 (Dec. 11, 1997).
39. See American Bankers Ass'n v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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sales of the security on the secondary market. In general, these laws
require registration of securities and disclosure relating to transactions
involving the security and also prohibit fraud in connection with
transactions in the security. For non-bank issuers of securities, the SEC
is the primary regulator charged with administering these laws. Bank
issuers of securities are exempt from some of the federal securities laws
relating to transactions involving their securities. When the laws apply
to banks, the regulatory authority to administer the laws is divided
between the SEC and the "appropriate federal banking regulator."'
The definition of "security" in the Securities Act of 1933 (the
Securities Act) excludes "any security issued or guaranteed by any
bank."'" Therefore, banks need not comply with the registration
requirements of§ 5 of the Securities Act.42 Moreover, banks cannot be
held liable under § 12 of the Securities Act for violation of § 5
registration requirements, or for making a material misrepresentation or
omission in a prospectus or oral communication.43 Importantly, the
exemption for bank-issued stock does not apply to bank holding
companies." The federal banking agencies have adopted disclosure
requirements in connection with the purchase or sale of securities of a
bank.45 These disclosure requirements, however, are not adopted under
the authority of the securities laws, but, rather, the federal banking
statutes.
46
The provisions of § 12 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act),47 relating to the registration of securities traded on a
national securities exchange, apply to securities issued by banks. The
federal banking regulators, however, not the SEC, are responsible for
40. In this Part, the term "appropriate federal banking regulator" is used to refer to the OCC with
respect to the regulation of national banks; the Fed for state member banks; the FDIC for state non-
member banks; and the Office ofThrift Supervision (OTS) for savings associations.
41. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1997). The term "bank" under the
Securities Act means "any national bank, or any banking institution organized under the laws of any State,
territory, or the District of Columbia, the business of which is substantially confined to banking and is
supervised by the State or territorial banking commission or similar official." Id.
42. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1997).
43. See id § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 77!.
44. See Bankers Trust Co., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 178,474 (Oct.
22, 1971).
45. &e 12 C.F.R. §§ 16 (OCC), 303.15 (FDIC), 563.76 (OTS) (1997).
46. The OCC cites the provision creating the Office of the Comptroller, 12 U.S.C. § 1, and its
general rulemaking authority, 12 U.S.C. § 93a, as authority for the disclosure requirements provided in part
16 of its rules. See 12 C.F.R. § 16.1(a) (1997). The OTS cites various banking statutes as authority for its
regulation of offers and sales of association securities. See id § 563. The FDIC relies on various banking
statutes as authority for its regulation requiring disclosure of mutual-to-stock conversions. See id. 303.
47. June 6, 1934, ch 404, Tide I, § 1, 48 Star. 881.
448
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the administration of § 12 against banks.4 ' The same is true for §§ 13
(reporting requirements for issuers of securities registered on a national
securities exchange), 14(a) and (c) (regulation of proxy solicitations),
14(d) and (f) (regulation of tender offers), and 16 (regulation of short
swing insider profits) of the Exchange Act, i.e., the federal banking
regulators are responsible for the administration of those provisions
against banks.49 Congress directed the federal banking regulators to
"issue substantially similar regulations to regulations and rules issued by
the [SEC] under [these sections] unless they find that implementation
of substantially similar regulations with respect to insured banks and
insured institutions are not necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for protection of investors . . , 0 The federal banking
agencies have adopted the SEC's rules, regulations, and forms,5 or
substantially similar ones.
5 2
Perhaps most significantly, banks are subject to the antifraud
provisions of § 17 of the Securities Act53 and § 10(b) of the Exchange
Act.54 The SEC has the authority to enforce violations of these laws.5
B. Regulation of Securities Business
Congress also passed various laws regulating participants in the
securities business, for example, brokers, dealers, investment companies,
and investment advisers. In some instances, banks are exempt from
48. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1997). The OCC has responsibility
for national banks and banks operating under the law of the District of Columbia. The Fed has
responsibility with regard to all other banks that are members of the Federal Reserve, i.e., state member
banks. The FDIC has responsibility for all other FDIC-insured banks, i.e., state nonmember banks. The
OTS has responsibility for all FDIC-insured savings associations. See id. For an in-depth discussion of§
12(1) and an argument in favor of its repeal, see Michael P. Malloy, The 12(i)'edMonster: Administration of the
Secuities Echange Act of 1934 by the Federal Bank Regu/atoy Agencies, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 269 (1990).
49. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(i), 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1997).
50. Id.
51. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 11.2 (OCC), 208.16(a) (Federal Reserve System), 563d (OTS) (1997).
52. See id § 335 (FDIC).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 77q. This is because § 17 applies broadly to any "person." The term "person"
under the Securities Act means "an individual, a corporation, a partnership, an association, ajoint-stock
company, a trust, any unincorporated organization, or a government or political subdivision thereof."
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(2) (1997).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). This is because § 10(b) applies broadly to any "person." The term "person"
under the Exchange Act means "a natural person, company, government, or political subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality of a government." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9)
(1997).
55. See mfia Part II.C (discussing the SEC enforcement authority). The Supreme Court has held that,
although the SEC must prove scienter in actions brought to enjoin violations of§ 17(a)(1) of the Securities
Act and § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, the SEC need not prove scienter under §§ 17(a)(2)
or 17(a)(3). See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 687-700 (1980).
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these laws. As with the laws relating to transactions in banks'
securities,56 when the laws regulating the securities business apply to
banks, the regulatory authority to implement and enforce the laws is
divided and sometimes shared between the SEC and the federal banking
regulators.
The Exchange Act exempts banks57 from the definitions of "broker"58
and "dealer."59 This excludes banks from the broker-dealer registration,
supervision, and regulation under the Exchange Act.6" Only the bank
itself is privy to these exemptions. Thus, if a bank holding company, a
bank subsidiary, or a non-bank affiliate of a bank engages in broker-
dealer activities, such entities would be subject to Exchange Act
regulation.6 In addition, foreign banks that engage in securities
business with individuals or companies located in the United States are
not exempt from broker-dealer registration unless they meet certain
regulatory requirements.62
Section 15B of the Exchange Act63 encompassed the federal
regulation of municipal securities64 brokers and dealers. Banks are not
56. See supra Part II.A.
57. The Exchange Act defines "bank" as:
(A) a banking institution organized under the laws of the United States, (B) a member bank
of the Federal Reserve System, (C) any other banking institution, whether incorporated or
not, doing business under the laws of any State or of the United States, a substantial portion
of the business of which consists of receiving deposits or exercising fiduciary powers similar
to those permitted to national banks..., and which is supervised and examined by State
or Federal authority having supervision over banks, and which is not operated for the
purpose of evading the provisions of this chapter, and (D) a receiver, conservator, or other
liquidating agent of any institution or firm included in clauses (A), (B), or (C) of this
paragraph.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(6) (1997).
58. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1997).
59. Id. § 3(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5).
60. See id. § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78o. The Exchange Act, however, does not exempt banks from its
general antifraud provisions. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. In 1985, the SEC promulgated
Rule 3b-9, which sought to bring banks acting as brokers or dealers within the SEC's regulatory authority.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals invalidated Rule 3b-9, holding that the rule exceeded the SEC's
authority under the Exchange Act. See American Bankers Ass'n v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
61. In addition, the definition of "bank" under the Exchange Act has been interpreted to exclude
savings associations, see St. Paul Federal Bank for Savings, SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act
LEXIS 1410 (Oct. 13, 1988), and credit unions, see DAVID A. LIPTON, BROKER-DEALER REGULATION,
§ 1.10[3] [e] (Securities Law Series, Vol. 15). Therefore, to the extent that such institutions engage in broker
or dealer activities, they are regulated by the SEC.
62. Set generally MELANIE L. FEIN, SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS § 10.03 [B] (1997).
63. June 6, 1934, ch 404, Tide I, § 15B, as addedJune 4, 1975, P.L 94-29, § 13, 89 Stat. 131; June
6, 1983, P.L. 98-38, § 4, 97 Stat. 207.
64. The term "municipal securities" means:
[S]ecurities which are direct obligations of, or obligations guaranteed as to principal or
interest by, a State or any political subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of
a State or any political subdivision thereof, or any municipal corporate instrumentality of
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excluded from the definition of "municipal securities dealer"65 and,
therefore, are required to register with the SEC and are subject to SEC
regulation and supervision.6 6 A bank acting as a municipal securities
dealer must comply with the rules of the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board (MSRB).67  Banks are also not excluded from the
definition of "municipal securities broker"' and are subject to the rules
and regulations of the MSRB that apply to municipal securities
brokers.69 Section 15B authorizes both the SEC and the appropriate
federal banking regulator to bring enforcement actions under that title
against banks acting as municipal securities dealers.7"
Section 15C of the Exchange Act encompassed the federal regulation
of government securities7 brokers and dealers. While banks are
included within the definitions of "government securities broker"72 and
one or more States, or any security which is an industrial development bond ....
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(39), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(29).
65. Id. § 3(a)(30), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(30). A bank is excluded from the definition of "municipal
securities dealer" if it does not buy or sell municipal securities for its own account as a part of its regular
business or if it buys or sells municipal securities in a fiduciary capacity. Id. The Exchange Act defines a
"municipal securities dealer" as:
[A]ny person (including a separately identifiable department or division of a bank) engaged
in the business of buying and selling municipal securities for his own account, through a
broker or otherwise, but does not include... (B) a bank, unless the bank is engaged in the
business of buying and selling municipal securities for its own account other than in a
fiduciary capacity, through a broker or otherwise: Provided, however, That if the bank is
engaged in such business through a separately identifiable department or division..., the
department or division and not the bank itself shall be deemed to be the municipal securities
dealer.
Id..
66. See id § 15B, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4. For a discussion of the regulation of banks acting as municipal
securities dealers, see David A. Upton, Broker-Dealer Regulation, (Securities Law Series, Volume 15) §
1.11[1].
67. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15B(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b). Congress directed the SEC
to establish the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and directed the MSRB to "propose and
adopt rules to effect the purposes of this chapter with respect to transactions in municipal securities effected
by brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers." 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(2) (1997).
68. The Exchange Act defines "municipal securities broker" as "a broker engaged in the business
ofeffecting transactions in municipal securities for the account ofothers." Section 3(a)(3 I) of the Exchange
Act; 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(3 1).
69. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15B(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b).
70. See id. § 15B(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(c).
71. Government securities are "securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. government and its
agencies and instrumentalities . . . [and] include U.S. Treasury securities and securities issued by
government agencies and government sponsored enterprises such as the Federal National Mortgage
Association, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Banks, and similar
entities." FEIN, supra note 62, § 10.03[B], n.92. The Exchange Act definition is found at 15 U.S.C. §
78c(42).
72. The Exchange Act defines "government securities broker" as "any person regularly engaged in
the business of effecting transactions in government securities for the account of others .... " Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(44), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(43).
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"government securities dealer,"73 they need not register with the SEC
as do non-bank government securities brokers or dealers.7 4 Instead, a
bank acting as a government securities broker or dealer must file written
notice with the appropriate federal banking regulator.75  The
appropriate federal banking regulator, not the SEC, has the authority
under § 15C to investigate or take other enforcement action against a
bank.76
Congress established a national system for clearance and settlement
of securities transactions under § 17A of the Exchange Act.77 Section
17A regulates "clearing agencies" which are firms that act as
intermediaries in the settlement of securities transactions.78 In general,
clearing agencies must register with the SEC. Banks, savings
associations, brokers and dealers, however, are exempt from registration
if they are engaged in clearing activities "solely by reason of functions
performed by such institution as part of customary banking, brokerage,
[or] dealing... or solely by reason of acting on behalf of a clearing
agency... in connection with the... services of the clearing agency
.... "7' Banks that are registered with the SEC as clearing agencies are
supervised by their appropriate federal banking regulator.8" The SEC,
however, retains its own enforcement and rulemaking authority.8'
73. Id. § 3(a)(44), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(44). A bank is excluded from the definition of "government
securities dealer" if it does not buy or sell government securities for its own account as a part of its regular
business or if it buys or sells government securities in a fiduciary capacity. See id. The Exchange Act defines
"government securities dealer" as:
[A]ny person engaged in the business of buying and selling government securities for his
own account, through a broker or otherwise, but does not include... (C) any bank, unless
the bank is engaged in the business of buying and selling government securities for its own
account other than in a fiduciary capacity, through a broker or otherwise ....
Id.
74. See id. § 15C(a)(I)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5(a)(1)(A).
75. S&e id § 15C(a)(I)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5(a)(1)(B). Id. § 3(a)(34)(G), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(34)(G).
76. See id § 15B(g)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5(g)(2).
77. June 6, 1934, ch 404, Tide I, § 17A, as addedJune 4, 1975, P.L. 94-29, § 15, 89 Stat. 141.
Congress found that "[t]he prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions,
including the transfer of record ownership and the safeguarding of securities and funds related thereto, are
necessary for the protection of investors and persons facilitating transactions by and acting on behalf of
investors." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 17A(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. 78q-l(a)(l).
78. Section 3(a)(23)(A) of the Exchange Act defines a "clearing agency" as:
[A]ny person who acts as an intermediary in making payments or deliveries or both in
connection with transactions in securities or who provides facilities for comparison of data
respecting the terms of settlement of securities transactions, to reduce the number of
settlements of securities transactions, or for the allocation of securities settlement
responsibilities.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(23)(A).
79. Id § 3(a)(23)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(23)(B).
80. Sme id § 3(a)(34)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(34)(B); § 17A(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-i(d).
81. S& id § 17A(d)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-l(d)(3)(B).
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Section 17A also provides for the registration and supervision of
transfer agents.82 Transfer agents perform certain functions that affect
the transfer of ownership of securities.13 Banks are not exempt from the
definition of "transfer agent" and, accordingly, must register with their
appropriate federal banking agency if they engage in transfer agent
activities.84  The appropriate federal banking regulators have the
primary responsibility to supervise and enforce § 17A as against banks. 5
The SEC retains backup rulemaking and enforcement authority.86
The Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA) excludes banks87 from
the definition of investment company.88 Bank holding companies are
also excluded from the definition.89 Banks, therefore, are excluded from
the registration, supervision, and regulation of investment companies
under the ICA.9"
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA) excludes banks9 from the
82. See id. § 17A(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-I(c).
83. Section 3(a)(25) of the Exchange Act defines "transfer agent" as:
[A]ny person who engages on behalf of an issuer of securities or on behalf of itself as an
issuer of securities in (A) countersigning such securities upon issuance; (B) monitoring the
issuance of such securities with a view to preventing unauthorized issuance, a function
commonly performed by a person called a registrar; (C) registering the transfer of such
securities; (D) exchanging or converting such securities; or (E) transferring record
ownership of securities by bookkeeping entry without physical issuance of securities
certificates.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(25).
84. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 17A(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(c)(2); § 3(a)(34)(B), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(34)(B).
85. See id. § 17A(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-l(d).
86. See id § 17A(d)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-l(d)(3)(B).
87. The term "bank" is defined under the Investment Company Act (ICA) similarly to the definition
found in the Exchange Act. The term "bank" under the ICA means:
(A) a banking institution organized under the laws of the United States, (B) a member bank
of the Federal Reserve System, (C) any other banking institution or trust company, whether
incorporated or not, doing business under the laws of any State or of the United States, a
substantial portion of the business of which consists of receiving deposits or exercising
fiduciary powers similar to those permitted to national banks... and which is supervised
and examined by State or Federal authority having supervision over banks, and which is not
operated for the purpose of evading the provisions of this subchapter, and (D) a receiver,
conservator, or other liquidating agent of any institution or firm included in clauses (A), (B),
or (C) of this paragraph.
Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(5) (1997).
88. See id. § 3(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(3). The exclusion also extends to insurance companies,
savings and loan associations, see id., and to brokers and dealers. Id. § 3(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(2).
89. See i § 3(c)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(6).
90. See id. § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8. See generall ROBERT ROSENBLUM, INVESTMENT COMPANY
DETERMINATION UNDER THE 1940 ACT: EXEMPTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS (1997).
91. "Bank" is defined under the Investment Advisers Act (IAA) similarly to the definition found in
the Exchange Act and in the ICA, see supra notes 57 and 87. The term "bank" under the IAA means:
(A) banking institution organized under the laws of the United States, (B) a member bank
of the Federal Reserve System, (C) any other banking institution or trust company, whether
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definition of investment adviser.92 In addition, the IAA goes one step
further by excluding any "banking holding company as defined in the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, which is not an investment
company"93 from the definition of investment advisers. This means that
banks and bank holding companies are not subject to the registration,
supervision, and regulation imposed by the IAA.94 The SEC has taken
the position, however, that non-bank affiliates of a bank are not exempt
from IAA registration.95 Moreover, any person providing investment
advice to an investment company, for example a bank providing
investment advice to a mutual fund, is subject to the restrictions on such
activity found in the ICA.96
C. Sources ofAgeney Enforcement Authority
Despite the bank exemptions found in the federal securities laws,
banks must answer to significant securities law regulation. As discussed,
the responsibility for administration of the securities laws is divided and
shared between the SEC and the federal banking regulators. The
agencies' tools for the enforcement of those laws is discussed below.
1. SEC Enforcement Powers
The SEC may seek injunctive relief in any U.S. district court for
violations of the securities laws by banks and non-banks.97 The SEC has
the authority to bring administrative cease and desist proceedings for
violations of the securities laws.98 The SEC may also impose civil
incorporated or not, doing business under the laws of any State or of the United States, a
substantial portion of the business of which consists of receiving deposits or exercising
fiduciary powers similar to those permitted to national banks... and which is supervised
and examined by State or Federal authority having supervision over banks, and which is not
operated for the purpose of evading the provision of this subchapter, and (D) a receiver,
conservator, or other liquidating agent of any institution or firm included in clauses (A), (B),
or (C) of this paragraph.
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(2) (1997).
92. See id. § 202(a)(1 1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1)(A).
93. Id.
94. &eid §203, 15U.S.C.§80b-3.
95. See FEIN, supra note 62, § 10.03[E].
96. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a)(20), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(20) (defining an "investment
adviser" of an investment company).
97. See Securities Act of 1933 § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1997); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1997). See generalo, LOUIS LOSS &JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATON
4727-843 (3d ed. 1993).
98. See Securities Act of 1933 § 8A, 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2 IC, 15
U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3).
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penalties.99 The SEC may not utilize the enforcement authority
provided under § 1 5C of the Exchange Act against a bank acting as a
government securities broker or dealer.' 0 The SEC, however, retains
the authority to enforce other provisions of the securities laws against
banks acting as government securities brokers or dealers.'
2. Bank Regulators' Enforcement Powers
Congress delegated enforcement authority of certain provisions of the
federal securities laws to the federal banking regulators. For example,
the federal banking regulators enforce various Exchange Act provisions
relevant to transactions in banks' securities. 112  The federal banking
regulators also enforce the laws regulating municipal securities brokers
and dealers,0 3 government securities brokers and dealers, 0 4 clearing
agencies,0 5 and transfer agents."°6 Under these securities law provisions,
the federal banking regulators derive the authority to seek injunctive
relief '7 and to impose administrative sanctions.
0 8
The federal banking agencies take the position that they can bring
enforcement proceedings under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
(FDIA) for violations of the federal securities law.0 9 The FDIA,
generally, provides the banking agencies with four types of
99. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 21A, 21B, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-1, 78u-2.
100. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
101. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15C(1(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5(g)(2).
102. See id. § 12(i), 15 U.S.C. § 781(i). See discussion supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
103. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15B(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(c). See discussion supra note 70
and accompanying text.
104. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15C(g)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5(g)(2). See discussion supra note
76 and accompanying text.
105. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 17A(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78q- 1 (d). See discussion supra note 80
and accompanying text.
106. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 17A(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-l(d). e discussion supra note 85
and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u.
108. See, e.g., id § 15B(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(c) (censure, suspension, and revocation of registration for
municipal securities dealers); Id. § 15C(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5(c)(2) (censure, limitations on activities, and
suspension for government securities brokers and dealers); id. § 17A(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78q- 1 (c)(3) (censure
limitations on activities, and suspension for transfer agents).
109. Under the OCC's enforcement policy, "[t]he OCC may pursue enforcement actions available
under federal banking laws for securities law violations, when such actions provide a more effective or
efficient enforcement vehicle." OCC, Securities Activities Enforcement Policy, PPM-5310-5, at 3 (July 7,
1993). The Fed and the FDIC apparently take the same position. Se, e.g., In re Robert L. McCook, No.
96-027-B-I, Order by the Board of Govemors of the Federal Reserve System (June 3, 1997) (entering cease
and desist order under § 1818(b) of the FDIA for violations of NASD rules); In re American City Bank of
Tullahoma, FDIC-95-2b, 1995 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 5 (an. 11, 1995) (entering cease and desist order
under § 1818(b) of the FDIC for, among other things, violations of the Government Securities Act of 1986).
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administrative enforcement:c " termination of insurance,"' cease and
desist proceedings," 2 removal/suspension of individuals affiliated with
banks," 3  and civil money penalties." 4  The cease and desist,
removal/suspension, and civil money penalties provisions are all
triggered by, among other things, violations of law or regulation. The
FDIA cease and desist power can be invoked upon any finding that a
bank is violating, or has violated, "a law, rule, or regulation.""' 5 For
example, a cease and desist proceeding could be based on insider
trading, because such activity would violate § 10(b) of the Exchange
Act" 6 and Rule lOb-5." 
7
It is not clear, however, that Congress intended the enforcement
powers under the federal banking laws to apply, literally, to any
violation of law or regulation. At least one court has suggested in dicta
that the cease and desist authority may not reach that far. The Fifth
Circuit, in interpreting the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's (FHLB)1"
cease and desist authority, suggested that the "cease and desist power
would arise only when an association violates a law which protects the
association's financial integrity.""' 9 In the above example, it would be
difficult to argue that insider trading laws protect a bank's financial
integrity because the purpose of such laws is investor protection.
Therefore, if the Fifth Circuit's posited interpretation of the FHLB's
cease and desist authority were extended by the Fifth Circuit or other
circuits to the cease and desist power found in the EDIA, the federal
banking agencies' interpretation of their cease and desist authority
would be circumscribed.
Congress has provided some direct authority for the use of the FDIA
enforcement powers for securities laws violations. Congress has
110. See generaUy Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Fiduciay Duties'Denmiding Cousin: BankDirector Liability
for Unsafe or UnsoundBanking Pracices, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175, 202-04 (1995).
111. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a) (1996).
112. See id § 1818(b)(1).
113. See id § 1818(e).
114. See id§ 18181)(2).
115. Id § 1818(b)(1). Similarly, actions for removal from office can be based on a violation of "any
law or regulation." Id § 1818(e)(I)(A)(i)(I). Actions for civil money penalties can also be based on a
violation of "any law or regulation." Id § 1818(i)(2)(A)(i).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1997). For an interesting discussion regarding whether the federal banking
regulators have the authority to enforce directly § 10(b) (i.e., not through the banking laws) in the context
of the trading of bank-issued securities, see Michael P. Malloy, Can JOb-5for the Banks? The Effect OfAn
AntifraudRule On The Regulation Of Banks, 61 FORDHAM L REV. S23, S35-40 (1993).
117. &e 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
118. In 1989, Congress replaced the Federal Home Loan Bank Board with the OTS as the federal
regulator of savings associations. See 12 U.S.C. § 1463 (1996).
119. Gulf Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2d 259, 265 n.5 (5th Cir.
1981).
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explicitly provided that FDIA cease and desist proceedings and actions
for removal may be based on violations of §§ 15B, 120 15C,' 21 or 17A
122
of the Exchange Act. The existence of these explicit statutory linkages
may suggest that Congress did not otherwise intend the banking
regulators to use the FDIA to enforce the banking laws. It is just as
likely, however, that Congress never considered the issue.
III. CURRENT PARADIGM OF REGULATION OF BANK
SECURITIES ACTIVITIES
Establishing the boundaries of regulation (i.e., to whom and to what
should regulation apply) and dividing regulatory responsibility within
those boundaries (i.e., which agency or agencies should administer the
regulation) are complex determinations that involve a balancing of the
benefits of regulation with its costs. Policy makers, scholars, and
constituents have developed or adopted models to resolve these difficult
questions. In the context of the regulation of bank securities activities,
various models of regulation are generating debate. The two models of
regulation that relate most to the current paradigm of regulation are
functional regulation and institutional regulation. This Part begins with
a discussion of the concept of functional regulation, focusing on how it
can been distinguished from institutional regulation and the varying
interpretations of the functional regulation model. This Part then
considers the breadth and limits of the federal securities laws and the
division of regulatory responsibility for the implementation of those laws
and concludes that the current paradigm of bank regulation combines
elements of functional regulation and elements of institutional
regulation. Once consideration is given to actual bank securities
activities, however, the current model of regulation can be cast as the
functional equivalent to functional regulation.
A. Distinguishing Functional Regulation from Institutional Regulation
The term "functional regulation" describes various, related models of
regulation. Today, the concept of functional regulation enjoys such
popularity on Capitol Hill that its utterance insinuates sensible, modem,
regulatory reform.123  Functional regulation has also earned some
120. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15B(c)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(c)(5) (1997).
121. Id. § 15C(c)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5(c)(2)(B).
122. Id § 17A(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. 78q-l(d)(2).
123. In 1997 alone, the following testimony before congressional committees and subcommittees
indicated support for a functional regulation approach to financial modernization, see Dino Gavanes,
1998]
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Principal, Premier Risk Services, Inc., Before the Subcomm. on Finance and Hazardous Materials of the
House Comm. on Commerce (june 24, 1997); Glenn Pomeroy, Commissioner of Insurance for the State
of North Dakota, Before the Subcomm. on Finance and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on
Commerce (June 24, 1997); John D. Hawke,Jr. Treasure Under Secretary for Domestic Finance, Before
the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services (June 3, 1997); Nicolas Retsinas, Director, OTS,
Before the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services (May 22, 1197); Mary Griffin, Insurance
Counsel, Consumers Union, Before the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services (May 21, 1997);
John E. Taylor, President and CEO of the National Community Reinvestment Coalition, Before the House
Comm. on Banking and Financial Services (May 21, 1997); William V. Irons, Irons and Associates, Before
the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services (May 14, 1997); Brent Larsen, Chair, Financial
Services Task Force of the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, Before House Comm.
on Banking and Financial Services (May 14, 1997); Robert A. Gleason,Jr., On Behalf of The Council of
Insurance Agents & Brokers, Before the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services (May 14, 1997);
Brandon Becker, Before the Subcomm. on Finance and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on
Commerce (May 14, 1997); Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Before the House Comm. on Banking and
Financial Services (May 22, 1997); George Nichols, III, Commissioner of Insurance for the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Before the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services (May 22, 1997);
Denise Voigt Crawford, President-Elect, North American Securities Administrators Association, Before the
House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services (May 22, 1997); John G. Heimann, Chairman of Global
Financial Institutions, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., Before the House Comm. on Banking and Financial
Services (May 14, 1997); Paul A. Volcker, Before the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services
(May 14, 1997); Christine A. Edwards, On Behalf of Financial Services Council, Before the House Comm.
on Banking and Financial Services (May 14, 1997); Marc Lackritz, President, Securities Industry
Association, Before the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services (May 14, 1997); Jeffrey A.
Tassey, On Behalf of the American Financial Services Association, Before the House Comm. on Banking
and Financial Services (May 14, 1997); Michael P. Grace, President, National Association of Professional
Insurance Agents, Before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services (May 14, 1997);
Matthew P. Fink, President, Investment Company Institute, Before the House Comm. on Banking and
Financial Services (May 14, 1997); Dan R. Wentzel, President, American Land Title Association, Before
the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services (May 14, 1997); Richard C. Breeden, President,
Richard C. Breeden & Co., Before the Subcomm. on Finance and Hazardous Materials for the House
Comm. on Commerce (May 14, 1997); William T. McConnell, President-Elect, American Bankers
Association, Before the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services (May 7, 1997); Arnold D. Scott,
Senior Executive Vice President, Massachusetts Financial Services, Before the Subcomm. on Financial and
Hazardous Materials for the House Comm. on Commerce (May 1, 1997); James R. Klagholz, On Behalf
of the Independent Insurance Agents of America, Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit of the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services (Feb. 11, 1997); Chairman
D'Amato, Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking (May 1, 1997);
Mark Pope, Vice President and Director of Federal Government Relations, Lincoln National Corporation,
Before the Subcomm. on Finance and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Commerce (May 1,
1997); James F. Higgins, President and Chief Operating Officer, Dean Witter Financial, Before the
Subcomm. on Finance and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Commerce (May 1, 1997);
Cheryl Cook-Schneider, Principal, Edward D. Jones & Co., Before the Subcomm. on Finance and
Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Commerce (May 1, 1997); Mark B. Sutton, Executive Vice
President, Paine Webber Group, Inc., Before the Subcomm. on Finance and Hazardous Materials of the
House Comm. on Commerce (May 1, 1997); W. Craig Zimpler, Vice President of Government Relations,
Nationwide Insurance Enterprise, Before the Subcomm. on Finance and Hazardous Materials of the House
Comm. on Commerce (May 1, 1997); Roy C. Albertalli, On Behalf of the American Council of Life
Insurance, Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the House Comm. on
Banking (Feb. 11, 1997); SamuelJ. Baptista, President, Financial Services Council, Before the Subcomm.
on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit for the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services
(Feb. 11, 1997).
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amount of scholarly support. 12
Defining "functional regulation" begins most easily with defining
what it is not. Functional regulation is not institutional regulation.
Under a pure model of institutional regulation, or entity regulation, the
scope of regulation is determined according to institution type; for
example, banks are governed under the banking laws and those laws are
administered by bank regulators; securities firms are governed by the
federal securities laws and those laws are administered by the SEC.
25
Functional regulation rejects the institutional regulation model and
provides that scope of regulation should be divided according to
activity; 26 for example, all entities engaged in securities activities,
regardless of the form of the entity, should be governed by the federal
securities laws and those laws should be administered by a single
regulator, the SEC.'27
Functional regulation is said to be desirable because it provides
consistency. No matter what type of institution is involved in a
particular activity, the same rules apply. This provides a level playing
field to institutions operating within the industry and consistent
protections to consumers. Functional regulation also provides for a
system that allows for the development of expert agencies with the sole
responsibility for administering laws within their field of specialization.
This avoids, for example, the creation of securities divisions within each
of the federal banking regulators.
28
It is much more difficult to find testimony before congressional committees or subcommittees that is
at all critical of the functional model. For examples in 1997, see Ricki Heifer, Chairman, FDIC, Before
the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services (May 22, 1997); G. Edward Leary, Commissioner
of Financial Institutions for the State of Utah, Before the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services
(May 22, 1997).
124. Jane E. Willis, Banks and Mutual Funds: A Functional Approach to Reform, 1995 CoLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 221 (1995); Paul A. Caldarelli, Bank Growth in the Investment Company Industry: Do Guidelines Issued by the
Comptroller of the Cency Compensate For Bank E&csionfom Statutoy rvisions of the Federal Secuities Laws Drfinug
"Broker/Dealer" and "InvesimentAdviser"?, 17 CAMPBELL L. REV. 11 (1995); StephenJ. Friedman & Connie
M. Friesen, A New Parad nfor Fancal Regulation: GeUsfrvm Here to There, 43 MD. L. REV. 413 (1984). But
see Bert Ely, Functional Regulation Flunks: It Disregards Categoy Blun&r AM. BANKER, Feb. 21, 1997, at 4
(functional regulation is unworkable because of technological advances); Interview: Steven Waltman, THE
FINANCIAL REGULATOR, June 1, 1997 [hereinafter Walbman] (functional regulation is outdated).
125. Although banks' insurance activities are beyond the scope of this Article, under the institutional
model, banks' insurance activities would be regulated by the appropriate state insurance agency.
126. Alan Greenspan has described functional regulation "as a system in which each separate
'function'-such as commercial banking, investment banking, or mortgage banking-is supervised by the
same regulatory body, regardless of the function's location within a particular financial institution." Alan
Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Remarks Before the 31st
Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (May 11, 1995).
127. Similarly, one could argue that, when any entity engages in deposit-taking activity, it should be
regulated by one regulator, presumably the bank regulators.
128. The functional regulation model also avoids the possibility of regulatory competition which
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The principle flaw of the functional regulatory model is that
separating the functions or activities of an institution, and assigning
different laws and agencies to those functions, creates a situation in
which no regulator has an overall picture of the institutions' operations
and how the overall operations impact regulatory goals. Moreover, the
functional model, by definition, requires the regulated institution to
answer to multiple regulators. This results potentially in increased costs
for the regulated institutions which are avoided under the institutional
model.'29 Finally, the functional model presupposes the ability to
identify and divide activities, i.e., it assumes a distinction between
securities products, depository products, and insurance products. In
practice, however, particularly with the development of increasingly
complex financial instruments, it is often difficult to label financial
products.3 '
The application of the functional regulation model is multifaceted.
As with any model that seeks to address the scope of regulation, the
functional regulation model addresses two fundamental issues. First, a
model of regulation must address the parameters of the substantive law
at issue. This Article refers to this issue as one of regulatoy breadth. In
the context of banks' securities activities, the question of regulatory
breadth addresses whether banks should be subject to the same laws as
non-bank financial institutions. a' Under the functional model, the
federal securities laws would be applied to banks' securities activities
without exception.
Second, a model of regulation must address the division of
responsibility for implementation of substantive laws among agencies.
This Article refers to this issue as one of regulatoy division. With regard
to banks' securities activities, the question of regulatory division asks
which regulator is responsible for administering the substantive law
results when more than one regulatory has the, responsibility for administering a regulatory scheme. With
regard to traditional bank activities, the current system fosters competition between the regulators because
there are multiple agencies charged with administering the federal banking laws. The benefits and existence
of regulatory competition have been the source of much debate. See Arthur E. Wilmarth,Jr., The Epansion
of State Bank Powers, The Federal Response, and The Case For eserving the Dual Bankig System, 58 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1133, 1241-42 (1990); Henry N. Butler &Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual
Banking System, 73 CoRPNELL L. REV. 677 (1988); Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System A Model of
Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. I (1977).
129. Such costs include those created by duplicative supervision and also those created, in some cases,
by conflicting supervision.
130. It took a decision by the United States Supreme Court to determine that annuities are not
insurance. See NationsBank ofN.C., NA. v. Variable Annuity life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995).
131. Under the functional model, the converse is, of course, also true. In other words, to the extent
that non-bank firms were to engage in deposit-taking activities, they would be regulated under banking
laws.
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regulating those activities. Under the functional model, the SEC would
be responsible for administering laws that relate to securities activities
and the bank regulators would be responsible for administering laws
regulating banking activities.
In addition to serving as a model to address the issues of regulatory
breadth and regulatory division, the functional model has been used to
support the position that different activities within a financial
organization should be segregated into separate legal entities-
subsidiaries or affiliated entities-because such separation facilitates the
functional approach.'32 Finally, functional regulation has also been used
to refer to a regulatory model that eliminates an umbrella regulatory
function in that it seeks to regulate specific products or activities as
opposed to overall operations.133
B. The Breadth and Division of Regulatog, Responsibiliy Under
the Current Regime
The functional and institutional regulation models can be used to
divine the current regulatory regime governing banks' securities
activities. Although the regulation of bank securities activities appears
to have been modeled on the basis of combining functional and
institutional regulatory elements, once actual bank practices are taken
into consideration, the form of regulation takes on a more functional
shape. This subpart explores the current regulatory regime first by
looking at the issue of regulatory breadth, and then by considering the
issue of regulatory division.
132. Greenspan, supra note 126. In reality, a model that segregates activities into separate legal
entities is a combination of institutional regulation and functional regulation in that the division of
regulatory responsibility coincides with the division of activities among entities. The Comptroller has
criticized this approach as too restrictive on the prerogative of businesses to decide how to structure their
corporations. See Fmiandal &i Resbuctaig: Heanngs on H.R 10 Before Uhe House ConmL on Bonking and Finan.
Sewics, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency) (commenting
on provisions of H.R. 10). It is no surprise that the Fed would support this type of functional regulation
because it would likely push securities activities of banks out of the bank itself and into an entity that would
be regulated by the Fed, for example, a § 20 subsidiary. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text
(discussing § 20 subsidiaries).
133. See Financial &nies Co ianessAcL Heaings on H.R. 1062 Before the House Comm. on Banking and
Finaw. Seroes, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement ofJames L Bothwell, Director, Financial Institutions and
Markets Issues, GAO).
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1. Regulatory Breadth
In the last fifteen years, as banks have become increasingly involved
in the securities business,'34 the issue of regulatory breadth (the extent to
which the federal securities laws apply to the securities activities of
banks) has become more significant. Under many provisions of the
federal securities laws, Congress has taken a functional approach to the
application of the securities laws to banks' securities activities. The
antifraud provisions of both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act
apply to banks.'35 The securities registration provisions of the Exchange
Act apply to securities issued by banks." 6 Banks are subject to securities
law regulation of municipal securities and government securities brokers
and dealers. 7 Banks are governed by securities law regulation of
transfer agents.
3 8
The most obvious deviations from Congress's functional approach are
the exemptions for banks from the registration requirements under the
Securities Act,'39 the broker and dealer registration and supervision
under the Exchange Act,"4 and the registration and supervision of
investment advisors under the IAA.'4' Except with respect to
application of the anti-fraud provisions, these bank securities activities
are not regulated under the securities laws.
Given this statutory scheme, one could conclude that Congress
created a system of regulation that utilizes both functional and
institutional regulation in determining regulatory breadth. Once
consideration of banks actual securities activities is added into the
equation, it appears that the breadth of regulation falls substantially into
a functional mode - with the possible exception of the exemption from
the IAA.
134. According to a report by the American Banker's Association:
While some banking institutions were involved in discount brokerage and other limited
securities activities prior to the 1980s, it is generally agreed that the bank retail investment
services industry began in the early 1980s and is, accordingly, about 15 years old. Banking
institutions have become active participants in the retail distribution of securities products
over that period.
AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, 1996 NATIONAL SURVEY OF BANK RETAIL INVESTMENT SERVICES,
9 (1997) [hereinafter 1996 SURVEY].
135. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 63-76 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. Banks may be exempt from clearing-agency
regulation if their activities in that area are limited. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
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The bank exemption from the registration requirements of the
Securities Act only benefits (in terms of avoiding regulation) banks
whose securities are publicly held. To the extent that the securities of
most banks are owned by bank holding companies, 42 the registration
requirements would have no application even without the bank
exemption. Therefore, the exemption does not have the actual impact
suggested from the language of the statute.
The bank exemption from broker and dealer regulation under the
Exchange Act only benefits those banks operating broker and dealer
activities in the bank itself. Given the restrictions of the Glass-Steagall
Act, banks must conduct many securities activities in a bank subsidiary
or non-bank affiliate.'43 Broker and dealer activities conducted in a
bank subsidiary or non-bank affiliate of a bank are subject to the full
range of Exchange Act regulation.
As to those securities activities that are permissible at the bank level,
for example, retail brokerage, very few banks conduct such activities in
the bank itself. ' The vast majority of banks conduct those activities
through a registered broker and dealer subject to the full scheme of
Exchange Act regulation.'45 In practice, therefore, the broker and
142. The Fed reports that at year-end 1996, bank holding companies "controlled 7,213 insured
commercial banks and held approximately 93 percent of the assets of all insured commercial banks in the
United States." Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 83RD ANNUAL REPORT, at 227 (May
28, 1997) <http://www.bog.frb.fed.us./boarddocs/RptCongress/annual96/annual.pdf>. At year-end
1996, there were 9,997 banks. See i at 314. Therefore, 72% of banks are controlled by bank holding
companies. One cannot conclude that none of the 7,213 banks controlled by bank holding companies issue
securities to the public, but it is likely that most do not.
With regard to the 2,784 banks that are not controlled by bank holding companies, it is probable that
these are small institutions (to the extent they hold only 7% of all bank assets) and that many of them are
privately held.
143. See supra Part 1.
144. In 1995, the General Accounting Office reported that only 287 banks, or about 12% of banks,
provided securities brokerage directly through the bank, i.e., on bank premises and through bank
employees. See GAO, Banks'Secwa iActwiits: Owrihl D iffrs D d on Acfivi and Regulator, GAO/GGD-
95-214 (Sept. 1995). On the other hand, in 1996, the SEC supervised approximately 8,500 broker-dealers.
1996 SEC Ann. Rep., at 39.
More recently, the American Bankers Association issued a report concluding that only 1.7% of
banking institutions (including commercial and savings banks, savings associations, and credit unions)
provided discount brokerage directly through the bank. See 1996 SURVEY, supra note 134, at 29. The
report also concludes that only 1.0% of banking institutions provide full service brokerage directly through
the bank. Id.
145. For example, the American Bankers Association has found that, with regard to discount
brokerage services, 2 3 .9 % of banking institutions (including commercial and savings banks, savings
associations, and credit unions) provide such service through a bank or holding company owned subsidiary,
and 70.8% of banking institutions provide such service through a third-party brokerage or marketing
company. See id. Brokerage activities conducted by these entities are subject to full federal securities law
regulation, administered by the SEC.
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dealer activities of banking organizations are regulated predominantly
on a functional basis.
The picture differs slightly with regard to the bank and bank holding
company exemption from the IAA. In recent years, banks have
acquired a more significant role in providing investment advice to
registered investment companies. Although the numbers of banks
providing investment advice is not significant,"4 these banks are advising
a significant portion of registered investment companies.4 7 Therefore,
the regulatory gap created by the IAA exemption is not narrowed in
light of actual bank practices.
2. Regulatory Division
The division of regulation governing bank securities activities involves
not only the question of whether a bank regulator or the SEC will
administer securities regulation, but also which of the many bank
regulators-the Fed, OCC, FDIC, or the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS)-will have responsibility. Bank regulation in this country has
been divided at the federal level between and among various agencies.
Under the dual banking system,"' a bank may receive a charter from
either a state government or the federal government. Federal regulatory
responsibility under the federal banking laws is divided on the basis of
whether a bank is a state chartered bank or a federally chartered bank
(national bank).4" Federal regulatory responsibility under the federal
banking law is also divided according to whether or not a state bank is
a member of the Federal Reserve System. 5  Federal regulatory
146. According to SEC Chairman Levitt, as of December 31, 1996, 119 banks were providing
investment advice to funds. See Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Before the House Committee on Banking
and Financial Services Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit (Feb. 13, 1997). The
total number of banks as of December 31, 1996, was 9,490. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 83RD ANNUAL REP RT, supra note 141, at 314.
147. According to SEC Chairman Levitt, "[a]s ofDecember 31, 1996, 119 banks advised 2857 funds
(including individual classes), representing approximately 28% ofall funds registered with the Commission.
Also as of that date, assets of bank-advised funds totaled $493.2 billion, or 15% of total mutual fund assets."
Levitt, supra note 145.
148. For a general discussion of the dual banking system, see Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Recent
Chal&ngs to the Persistent Dual Baning System, 41 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 263 (1996).
149. The OCC is the primary federal regulator for all nationally chartered commercial banks. See
12 U.S.C. §§ 26, 93a (1994). Regulatory responsibility for state chartered banks is divided between the
FDIC and the Fed. See infa note 40.
150. The Fed is the primary federal regulator for state chartered commercial banks that are members
of the Federal Reserve System and for bank holding companies. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 248, 1844. The FDIC
is the primary federal regulator for state chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve
System. See id § 1813(q)(3). In addition, the FDIC has the ability, under certain circumstances, to bring
enforcement actions against any insured bank and its officers, directors, and other affiliated professionals.
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responsibility is further divided on the basis of whether the institution is
a commercial bank or a savings association. 5'
Congress has followed a model of institutional regulation of bank
securities activities to the extent that it has granted the banking agencies
power to administer the securities laws in some important areas.
Responsibility for administration of these provisions of the securities
laws falls on the primary regulator of the institution. For example, the
federal banking agencies, rather than the SEC, administer various
provisions of the Exchange Act regarding banks' registered securities.'52
The federal banking agencies are primarily responsible for administering
the securities law regulation of government securities dealers,
153
municipal securities dealers, 154 clearing agencies,'55  and transfer
agents. 1
56
The SEC retains the authority to enforce the antifraud provisions.'57
The SEC and the federal banking agencies share enforcement authority
with regard to banks acting as municipal securities brokers and
dealers. 5 ' In addition, the SEC has backup enforcement authority with
regard to banks acting as clearing agencies or transfer agents.'59
The statutory framework appears more closely modeled on an
institutional framework rather than a functional one. If regard is limited
to actual bank activities, that perspective is altered considerably,
particularly with respect to the regulation of municipal securities dealers
and government securities dealers. For example, while the federal
banking agencies have the authority to administer the securities
registration provisions under the Exchange Act, very few banks have
registered securities. 6 ° Similarly, only a small fraction of banks are
See id. § 1818(t).
151. The OTS is the primary federal regulator for savings associations. See it § 1463.
152. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
160. In 1996, 36 state member banks had registered securities, see Board of Governors for the Federal
Reserve System, 82ND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 141, at 246; 191 state nonmember banks had
registered securities, see Securities of Nonmember Insured Banks, 61 Fed. Reg. 33,696 (1996) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 335) (proposedJune 28, 1996); and 42 national banks had registered securities. Telephone
Interview with Unnamed OCC Employee (July 1997) [hereinafter OCC Interview]. This represents 3.5%
of the 1,014 state member banks, 3.2% of the 5,789 state nonmember banks, and 1.5% of the 2,687
national banks. By way of comparison, in 1995, the total number ofcompanies required to file reports with
the SEC under the Exchange Act was 12,753. See SEC, Directory of Companies Required to File Annual
Reports With the Securities and Exchange Commission Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Sept.
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acting as municipal securities brokers and dealers, 61 and government
securities brokers and dealers.' 62 While it is also true that only a small
fraction of banks are acting as clearing agencies"' or transfer agents,
164
their numbers represent a significant portion of all institutions acting as
clearing agencies'65 or transfer agents. 66 In sum, the bank regulators'
responsibilities under the federal securities laws inure to few regulatees.
Except with regard to clearing agencies and transfer agents, the few that
are regulated by bank regulators represent a small fraction of their
regulated peer groups.
3. Breadth and Division Taken Together
As a result of the convergence of Glass-Steagall restrictions 67 on
banks' securities activities and the limited nature of the exemptions
provided under the securities laws,' 68 the federal securities laws establish
a system of regulation that combines the functional and institutional
models. Viewed in light of current banking practices, however, the
current operating model of regulation is much closer to a functional
30, 1995).
161. In 1996, 38 state member banks were acting as municipal securities brokers or dealers. See
Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve System, 82ND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 141, at 230. This
represents 3.7% of the 1,014 state member banks. In 1996, 30 state nonmember banks were acting as
municipal securities brokers or dealers. Telephone Interview with Unnamed FDIC Employee, Securities
Capital Markets and Trust Branch (July 1997) [hereinafter FDIC Interview]. This represents .5% of the
5,789 state non-member banks. In 1996, 75 national banks were acting as municipal securities brokers or
dealers. OCC Interview, supra note 160. This represents 2.7% of the 2,687 national banks.
162. In 1996, 42 state member banks were acting as government securities brokers or dealers. See
Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve System, 82ND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 141, at 229-30.
This represents 4.10% of the 1,014 state member banks. In 1996, 28 state nonmember banks were acting
as government securities brokers or dealers. FDIC Interview, supra note 161. This represents .4% of the
5,789 state nonmember banks. In 1996, 83 national banks were acting as government securities brokers
or dealers. OCC Interview, supra note 160. This represents 3% of the 2,687 national banks.
163. In 1996, 3 state member banks were acting as clearing agencies. See Board of Governors for the
Federal Reserve System, 82ND ANNUALREPORT, supra note 141, at 230. This represents .02% of the 1,014
state member banks. In 1996, no state nonmember banks or national banks were acting as clearing
agencies. FDIC Interview, supra note 161; OCC Interview, supra note 160.
164. In 1996, 170 state member banks were acting as transfer agents. See Board of Governors for the
Federal Reserve System, 82ND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 141, at 231. This represents 16.7% of the
1,014 state member banks. In 1996, 163 state non-member banks were acting as transfer agents. This
represents 2.8% of the 5,789 state non-member banks. In 1996, 287 national banks were acting as transfer
agents. OCC Interview, supra note 160. This represents 10.6% of the 2,687 national banks.
165. In comparison to the 3 clearing agencies supervised by the federal banking regulators, see supra
note 163, the SEC supervised 15 registered clearing agencies in 1996. See 1996 SEC Ann. Rep., at 39.
166. In comparison to the 620 transfer agents supervised by the federal banking regulators, see supra
note 164, the SEC supervised 748 transfer agents in 1996. See 1996 SEC Ann. Rep., at 39.
167. See supra Part 1.
168. See supra Part 11.
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model than an institutional one-a functional equivalent of functional
regulation. Whether it is due to Glass-Steagall restrictions, business
expediency, or perceived risk aversion, banks generally have not
conducted their securities business in the bank itself. Thus, the securities
laws generally apply (and the SEC generally administers those laws) to
securities activities conducted by banks because those activities are
housed in a bank subsidiary or non-bank affiliate of the bank. With
respect to regulation of transactions in a bank's own securities, again, an
insignificant number of banks issue publicly traded securities. To the
extent that the institutional model is employed in our current system,
little actual securities regulation occurs under that format.
IV. TODAY: THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT TO FUNCTIONAL
REGULATION SUFFICES
Given the traditional goals of regulating financial institutions and the
current modest level of securities activities conducted by banks
themselves, this Part seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of the current
model of regulating banks' securities activities. This Part concludes that
the current model of regulation, the functional equivalent of functional
regulation, provides an acceptable compromise between the benefits of
functional regulation and those of institutional regulation given the
current level and structure of banks' securities activities.
169
A. Traditional Regulatory Goals and Methods
The macro-level challenge to the regulation of bank securities
activities is identifying a model that can serve the arguably very different
goals of regulating the banking industry versus the securities industry.
The primary purpose of bank regulation is the maintenance of the
safety and soundness of banking institutions. 7° This translates into more
169. Part V concludes that the current model, and models for reform that aspire towards more pure
functional regulation, will not prove enduring for the future.
170. The OCC's mission statement provides that "[t]he Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
serves [the national] interest by maintaining and promoting a system of bank supervision and regulation
that promotes safety and soundness by requiring that national banks adhere to sound management
principles and comply with the law .... . . OCC, Mission Statement (visited July 10, 1997)
<http://www.occ.treas.gov/mission.htm>.
In addition to its role in regulating state nonmember banks, the FDIC has the unique role as deposit
insurer. Therefore, the FDIC's mission statement is focused on protection of the deposit insurance funds.
The FDIC's mission statement provides that "the FDIC promotes the safety and soundness of insured
depository institutions and the U.S. financial system by identifying, monitoring, and addressing risks to the
deposit insurance funds." FDIC Strategic Plan 1998-2002 (visited July 10, 1997)
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than protecting insured deposits: banks have been said to occupy a
"special" role in our financial system.' 7' Because of banks' special role,
regulation of banks has sought to preserve the institutions themselves
often by protecting banks from normal market forces.'72 Traditional
bank regulation, therefore, has focused not only on the protection of
insured, or even uninsured deposits, but also on the safeguarding of the
banking system. '73
Distinctly, the primary purpose of regulation of securities activities is
investor protection. Certainly, the goal of investor protection has
extensive overlap with safety and soundness goals to the extent that
guarding the safety and soundness of an institution should also result in
the protection of investor interests. Traditional securities regulation,
however, does not take the next step. The goal of the federal securities
laws is not to protect institutions from failure.'74 Therefore, investor
protection under the securities laws is achieved, primarily, through a
system that seeks to ensure the fairness of the securities markets, but not
the solvency of the players in those markets.'75
<http://www.fdic.gov/about/strplan.html#Mission>.
171. Gerald Corrigan, of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, is credited with coining the
"banks are special" argument. See GERALD CORRIGAN, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOuS, ARE
BANKS SPECIAL? ANNUAL REPORT (1982). Corrigan argued that banks are special because they issue
transaction accounts, they serve as a backup source of liquidity for all other institutions, and they serve as
the transmission belt for the Fed's monetary policy (by lending more money to their customers when reserve
requirements are lower, and less money when reserve requirements are raised). See id
172. Certainly, in recent years of deregulation, much of the insulation from market forces that banks
once enjoyed has been dismantled. For example, bank were once freed from competition on interests rates.
The passage of the Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L 96-221,
Tide VII, § 707(a), 94 Stat. 188, eliminated this barrier from competition. In addition, attempts have been
made to remove the "too big to fail" rule from bank regulatory culture. In 1991, Congress passed the
Federal Deposit Insurance Improvement Act (FDICIA) which provided, inter a//a, that the FDIC must apply
the "least cost test" to decisions regarding the resolution of insolvent institutions. Specifically, FDICIA
provides that the FDIC must determine that its actions are "the least costly to the deposit insurance fund
of all possible methods for meeting the [FDIC's] obligation[sj." 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A)(ii) (1994).
Significantly, however, the least cost test does not apply if the application of the test "would have serious
adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability" and upon written recommendation of the
Board of Directors of the FDIC, the Board of Governors of the Fed, and the Secretary of the Treasury.
Id § 1823(c)(4)(G).
173. The OCC's mission statement provides that "[t]he national interest requires that there be a safe
and stable financial system that preserves public confidence and makes available a wide variety of financial
services in a competitive marketplace." OCC, Misson State ent (visited July 10, 1997)
<http://www.occ.treas.gov/mission.htm>. The Fed states that it works to "ensure safety and soundness
in the operation of financial institutions, stability in the financial markets, and fair and equitable treatment
of consumers in their financial transactions." BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 71(8th ed. 1994).
174. There are exceptions. For example, the ICA imposes capital requirements on investment
companies. Section 18 of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18.
175. The SEC states that the purpose of the federal securities laws "is to protect investors in securities
markets that operate fairly and to ensure that investors have access to disclosure of all material information
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Historically, the banking regulators and the SEC have employed very
different methods toward achieving their regulatory goals. The
regulation of banks has been grounded primarily in a prophylactic
system that entails outright restrictions on activities'76 and heavy
monitoring of permissible activities, including regular on- and off-site
monitoring of individual institutions.177 In sharp contrast, the regulation
of the securities industry has been grounded in mandatory disclosure. 78
Actual monitoring of activities is much less frequent179 and review of
filings is based on a sampling. 8° Heavy use of enforcement authority is
used as a deterrent.'
8'
B. Evaluation of the Current Paradigm
As discussed in Part III, the current paradigm of regulation of banks'
securities activities is, with exceptions, predominantly a model of
functional regulation. Congress established the current system under
the traditional regulatory goals: safety and soundness and investor
protection. The current system, however, was established at a time
when banks' securities activities were virtually nonexistent. The
increase in activity over the last fifteen years calls into consideration the
effectiveness of the current model.
concerning publicly traded securities." The US. Securities and Exchange Commission: What t Is, What t Does
(visitedJuly 10, 1997) <http://www/sec.gov/asec/asecart.html>.
176. Professor Garten has concluded that, in recent years, bank regulators have begun to rely less on
outright prohibitions on activities and more on risk management to ensure safety and soundness. See Helen
A. Garten, Rgulatory Growing Pans. A Peespctive On Bank Rladion In a Deregudao Age, 57 FORDHAM L REV.
501 (1989).
177. As of 1993, every insured depository institution must be examined at least once a year, with an
exception for smaller institutions which must be examined at least every 18 months. See Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Act, § 111 (1991) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d) (1994)).
178. See supra note 175.
179. In response to the growth in the mutual fund industry, the SEC recently increased its inspection
staff and has continued to achieve its goal of inspecting families of mutual funds at least every five years.
See GAO, MutualFunds, supra note 3, at 7.
180. In 1996, the SEC reviewed 26% of the filings of reporting issuers. See 1996 SEC Ann. Rep., at
78.
181. In 1996, the SEC initiated 453 enforcement actions. See 1996 SEC Ann. Rep., at 1. In contrast,
the FDIC initiated 105 enforcement actions in 1995, see 1995 FDIC ANN. REP. 2 1; the Fed initiated 133
enforcement cases involving 285 actions in 1996, see Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve System,
83RD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 141, at 228; and the OCC initiated 79 enforcement actions in 1996,
see EUGENE A. LUDWIG, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, QUARTERLYJOURNAL VOL
16 No. (1997).
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1. Evaluation of Current Regulatory Breadth
As discussed above, the federal securities laws, in large part, apply to
bank securities activities. At first blush, common sense suggests that the
federal securities laws should apply, without exception, to bank securities
activities in the same way they apply to the same activities when
conducted by a non-bank. For the most part, they do. Part III
concludes that some of the exceptions (for example, bank-direct broker
and dealer activities) are small in terms of the actual volume of activity
involved.' 82 That conclusion may suggest that the exceptions do not
merit debate or reform, or that the exceptions are not worthy of special
attention. Worthy or not, the exceptions have been the subject of much
critique.'83
The traditional justification for the special exceptions under the
federal securities laws for certain bank securities activities is that banks
are already subject to comprehensive regulation. Another layer of
regulation, therefore, would be largely repetitive and unduly onerous.
Certainly, it is not unusual for a regulatory scheme to rely on a different
regulatory system to achieve its goals. The banking laws currently rely,
in part, on the effectiveness of foreign government supervision of foreign
banks to protect those dealing with branches of such foreign banks
established in the United States.'84 There is no definitive reason why the
regulation of securities activities could not rely on a parallel system of
regulation to achieve its goals. One might even ask why the bank
exceptions are not broader. Banks are subject to far greater actual
supervision than the non-banks involved in the securities markets." 5
The issue then becomes whether safety and soundness based
regulation achieves sufficiently the goals of regulating securities
activities. To be sure, safety and soundness based regulation provides
investor protection. It provides, however, a different kind of investor
protection than the disclosure based regulation that is at the core of the
securities laws. For example, an investor who purchases stock issued by
a bank is the beneficiary of the extensive regulation of the bank's
182. The danger in relying on current statistics is that they change. For this reason, and others, I
suggest in Part V that more comprehensive reform of the current system should be considered.
183. See Levitt, supra note 145; Securities Reguatory Equality: Hearings on H.R. 3447 Before the Subcomm.
on Tekcomm. and Fin. of tS Senate Comm. on Enerp and Commerce, 103d Cong. (1994) (statements of Matthew
P. F nk, President, Inv. Co. Inst.); Financial Sewic Competiion Act of1997: Heanngs on HR. 10 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Fin. Sers., 105th Cong. (1997) (statements of Denise Voigt Crawford, Tex. Sec.
Comm'r, on behalf of the N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs).
184. The Fed may not approve an application by. a foreign bank to establish a branch or agency in
the United States unless the foreign bank "is subject to comprehensive supervision or regulation on a
consolidated basis by the appropriate authorities in its home country." 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(2)(A) (1994).
185. See supra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
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operations under the banking laws to the extent that such regulation
prevents the failure of the bank.'86 The investor in bank stock, however,
would not receive the extensive disclosure that is available regarding
companies subject to § 5 of the Securities Act.'87
The securities activities of banks could be regulated under a different
scheme than the securities activities of non-banks. This could save
banking institutions and taxpayers from the cost of an additional layer
of regulation. Other costs, however, may outweigh these savings. For
example, under such a system, investors would receive different
protections depending on whether they conducted their securities
activities with a bank or a non-bank. If we had proof that one system of
regulation was better than the other, then the easy answer would be to
adopt the "better" regulatory system. In the absence of such evidence,
it is perhaps preferable to choose one system over the other for the sake
of consistency. Under the current system, because the vast majority of
securities activities are regulated under the securities laws, it seems
preferable to close the remaining gap. In any event, the carving out of
exceptions that are small in real terms does not have the aggregate cost-
saving benefits that would be achieved by eliminating entirely an extra
layer of regulation.'88
2. Evaluation of Regulatory Division
The issue of regulatory division questions whether Congress was
correct in dividing responsibility for administration of the securities laws
primarily along institutional lines. This model of dividing regulatory
responsibility has the benefit of reducing the number of agencies that are
involved in the supervision of any particular bank. This could reduce
costs of regulation to the banks8 9 and provide the institutional regulator
with the opportunity to supervise the full range of bank activities. 9 '
186. Certainly, many bankers would argue that this hypothetical investor would be better off without
the protections provided by the heavy regulation on banks. Without such regulation banks would be better
able to compete with their unregulated competitors. This would lead to greater profits and higher stock
prices.
187. The bank agencies, however, have adopted some required disclosure under the authority of the
banking laws. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
188. For example, although few bank securities are registered under the Exchange Act, see supra note
160 and accompanying text, the federal banking regulators, rather than the SEC, are responsible for
administering Exchange Act provisions governing those securities. It is likely true that any cost savings to
the few banks regulated under these provisions of the Exchange Act are outweighed by the investment by
the banking agencies to gain and maintain the expertise to administer those provisions.
189. This model could increase aggregate costs to regulatory agencies, however, insofar as more than
one agency has the responsibility for administering, and therefore becoming expert in, the same set of laws.
190. Eugene Ludwig described the appeal of the institutional approach as follows:
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The question remains whether the federal banking agencies are
effective in administering the securities laws. The banking agencies
have been criticized for their slugish adoption of rules implementing
provisions of the Exchange Act.191 In addition, the banking agencies
have been characterized as stealth-like regulators (because of the
traditional confidentiality associated with their supervision and
enforcement practices)'92 which are unable to administer a disclosure-
based regulatory system.
Although legitimate, these concerns may not create a sufficient basis
for reform of the current system. First, assuming that the banking
agencies are uncomfortable with disclosure based regulation, one answer
would be simply that they should improve."' In other words, the
solution to an agency's inability to administer a particular set of laws
does not necessarily lie in transferring that responsibility to another
regulator. The solution may be to force the responsible agency to
administer the laws as enacted and, if appropriate, provide additional
resources. Second, there is recent evidence that banking law and the
banking agencies are relying more on disclosure to regulate banking
activities.'94 Therefore, the banking agencies may improve their
administration of the securities laws concurrent with banks' increased
securities activities.
Evaluation of the banking agencies' administration of the federal
securities laws could also focus on their enforcement records. Based
upon numbers alone, it is possible to conclude that the bank regulators
have been lax in their enforcement of the securities laws.'95 The flaw in
A single regulator is in a better position to evaluate'risk across product lines, to assess the
adequacy of bank capital and operational systems to support all of the activities of the bank,
to take integrated supervisory and enforcement actions that address problems affecting
several different product lines, and to identify and deal with emerging supervisory issues.
Securities Regulatory Equaliy: Hearings on HR. 3447 Before the Subcomm. on TLecomm. and Fin. of the House of
Representatives Comm. on Enorg and Commerce, 103d Cong. 81, 82 (1994) (statement of Eugene A. Ludwig,
Comptroller of the Currency).
191. See Malloy, supra note 48, at 285-86.
192. See Michael P. Malloy, Public Disclosure as a Tool ofFedera Bank Regulation, ANN. REV. OF BANKING
LAW 229 (1990).
193. See, e.g., Malloy, supra note 48, at 295 (urging the banking agencies to improve their
administration of the Exchange Act as an alternative to the repeal of§ 12(i)).
194. With the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery Act of 1989, Congress amended
the long running practice of confidentiality by requiring cease and desist orders issued by the federal
banking regulators to be made public. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(u) (1994). In 1994, the banking agencies issued
a statement on nondeposit investment product retail sales which relies primarily on disclosure to inform
customers of risks associated with the purchase of such products. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ET AL., INTERAGENCY STATEMENT ON RETAIL SALES OF NONDEPOsrr
INVESTMENT PRODUCTS (1997). Seegenerally Malloy, supra note 192, at 235-43.
195. Using the OCC as an example, my research uncovered no actions enforcing the federal
securities laws for the first halfof 1997 and for 1996. In 1995, the 0CC brought enforcement proceedings
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this criticism is that its purely quantitative assessment does not take into
account the quality of enforcement. For example, depending on the
nature of the violations and the violator, one enforcement action could
have as much deterrent or prophylactic effect as ten. In addition, the
banking agencies would be likely to assert that their low enforcement
numbers are simply evidence of their supervisory success. Because the
bank regulators are active in supervision, with examinations of most
banks every year, they can prevent violations before they occur. Given
that they operate in a system with traditional bank supervision as the
foundation, they need not rely on the deterrent effect of enforcement as
the way to administer the federal securities laws.
The ultimate assessment of the above mixed bag of pros, cons, and
uncertainties must also consider the number of regulatees assigned to
each institutional regulator. As discussed in Part III, although the
administration of the federal securities laws is divided by institution, the
actual number of banks engaging in activities that are regulated under
those laws is relatively small. Given that the banking agencies'
responsibilities under the federal securities laws involve few regulatees,
it may be inefficient to require the banking agencies to develop federal
securities law expertise, even given the potential benefits of institutional
regulation, when that expertise will be used to regulate so few. At the
same time, allowing the option for securities law administration by the
institutional regulator may provide an outlet for those institutions that
deem the prospect of an additional regulator too onerous and, therefore,
would choose to conduct their securities activities within the bank itself
precisely to achieve the benefits of institutional regulation. 
9 6
All of the above suggests that it would be difficult to definitively grade
the banking agencies' administration of the federal securities laws. It is
probably safe to conclude, however, that the banking agencies are
administering the securities laws in a manner different from the SEC.
This outcome could be viewed as desirable because the tension or
competition between the regulators might produce benefits to the system
against various employees of Worthen Investment, Inc. for misrepresentations in connection with the sale
of mutual funds. See OCC Press Release, OCC and NASD Announce Seiement of Enforcement Actons Against
Employees of Worthen Securities, NR 95-121 (Nov. 7, 1995). In 1994, the OCC brought five enforcement
actions involving securities law violations. See In re Louis Betanzos, OCC EA No. 94-82, 1994 OCC Enf.
Dec. LEXIS 114 (May 6,1994); In re Walter E. Meadley,Jr., Oco EA No. 94-87, 1994 OCC Enf. Dec.
LEXIS 119 (May 31, 1994); In re Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 0CC EA No. 94-103, 1994 OCC Enf. Dec.
I.EXIS 150 July 1, 1994); In re National City Bank of Minneapolis, Minnesota, OCC EA No. 94-80, 1994
OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 112 (April 25, 1994); In re Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 0CC EA No. 94-158,
1994 0CC Enf. Dec., 1994 WL 652031 (Aug. 26, 1994).
196. This effect would be something closely related to the purported benefits of regulatory
competition. See generaly Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System- A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1977).
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of regulation.'9 7 Criticism of this inconsistency lies in its effect on
consumers. The institutional aspects of the current system result in
consumer protection that varies depending on who is the seller of the
financial product or the purveyor of the financial service. Clearly,
consumers are in no position to be aware of, let alone assess, the relative
merits of the different forms of protection.
3. Conclusion
The current model of regulating bank securities activities achieves a
precarious balance between the benefits of functional and institutional
regulation. The investor-protection goals of the federal securities law
might be attainable without application of the federal securities laws to
the securities activities of banks given the comprehensive and
unparalleled regulation of banks and all of their activities. It would not,
however, achieve the same investor protection as that provided by the
securities laws. Without empirical evidence to support the conclusion
that one set of laws provides better investor protection than the other,
the federal securities laws should apply to banks' securities activities
without exception,' providing the benefits of a level playing field to
participants in the securities industry and uniform consumer protections.
Given the narrow application of the current exemptions, our current
system conforms essentially with this aspiration by providing functional
regulation on the issue of regulatory breadth. On the other hand, the
current system avoids the problems associated with assigning regulatory
responsibilities to more than one regulator by relying primarily on the
institutional model on the issue of regulatory division. This eases, to a
degree, the regulatory burden associated with the overlay of the federal
securities laws onto traditional bank regulation.
V. TOMORROW: REGULATING RISK NOT FUNCTION
The current strength of both our banking industry and securities
markets makes a compelling statement regarding the effectiveness of the
current system of regulation. Rapid changes in the industry and
markets, however, could produce a different assessment in the future.
Moreover, continuing calls for reform suggest that industry participants
197. See supra note 196.
198. I consider the opposite conclusion, that the current federal banking laws should apply to non-
bank financial institutions in order to achieve investor-protection goals, to be an interesting possibility but
currently outside of the realm of real-world debate. In the future, this may not be as outrageous a
proposition. See infta notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
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are not satisfied with the current system. As a matter of substantive law,
reform proposals call for varying degrees of expansion of bank powers
into the securities and insurance markets. In this context, reform
measures also address questions of regulatory scope and focus primarily
on moving the current system towards a more pure system of functional
regulation.'99 This is quite understandable because the functional
regulation model preserves, to a great extent, agency turf-a distinct
political advantage."' The preservation of agency turf serves not only
the agencies, but also their industry constituents and the congressional
committees with jurisdiction over them.
This Part assumes that, either through legislation or continued
attempts at liberalization at the agency level,20' banks will continue to
increase their securities activities. This Part concludes that functional
regulation will not serve as an effective model for the regulation of
future banking activities. Instead, to meet the challenges of the evolving
financial marketplace, a model of regulation should focus on the risks
that financial regulation seeks to address.
A. Functional Regulation Will Not Endure
To the extent that proposed legislation would eliminate current bank
exemptions under the federal securities laws,20 2 such proposals offer an
incremental improvement over our current system. Still, the
fundamental problem with the current system and proposals for reform
is reliance upon the functional regulatory model, which is based on the
notion that regulation and regulatory responsibility can and should be
separated along functional, or product, lines. That notion is flawed.
First, the division of regulation along functional or product lines
suggests that different products represent distinct regulatory issues.
199. In the first session of the 105th Congress, three bills were introduced addressing financial
modernization: H.R. 10, H.R. 268, and H.R. 669/S. 298. All three bills provided for purer functional
regulation of banks' securities activities than under our current system although in different ways. For
example, H.R. 669/S. 298 provided for functional regulation by prohibiting banks that are owned by a
financial services holding company from engaging in many securities activities. In contrast, H.R. 10
provided for functional regulation by removing, for the most part, the current exemption for banks from
the definition of "broker" and "dealers," thus providing for regulation of those activities under the securities
laws by the SEC. The Treasury Department has also drafted a plan for financial modernization that
includes functional regulation reform provisions. See Financial Services Competition Act of 1997 (visited
June 6, 1997) <http://www.ustreas.gov/treasury/financial/domfin/fsca/>.
200. Because the current system is drawn largely along functional lines, especially when considering
the low level of securities activities conducted at the bank level, reform that aspires only to a purer form of
functional regulation does not entail great gains or losses for any of the federal regulators.
201. SeesupraPartI.
202. See supra Part II.
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They do not. A bank's FDIC insured deposits raise a host of regulatory
issues including potential loss to the bank insurance fund (if the bank
fails), fraud on depositors (if the bank lies), and potential disruptions to
our financial system (if the bank is big, and fails). A bank's brokerage
accounts raise a host of regulatory issues that do not include losses to the
bank insurance fund, but do include fraud on investors (if the bank lies)
and potential disruptions to our financial system (if the bank is big, and
fails). Put in broader terms, the banking agencies' safety and soundness
concerns are not contained within the traditional bank activities of
lending and deposit taking. To determine the safety and soundness of
a bank, the banking agencies must consider all of the bank's risk-taking
activities."'
Second, the functional regulation model assumes incorrectly that
financial products may be divided and conquered under different
regulatory schemes and by different agencies. This may have been true
when a bank deposit was a bank deposit and a stock was a stock. Yet,
if recent history is any indication of market trends, the blending of
traditional financial products will continue. Consider that today, it is
difficult to distinguish the regulatory concerns which arise from a mutual
fund account that provides check writing privileges from an insured
bank deposit. There is no FDIC insurance for the mutual fund, so there
is no risk to the bank insurance fund. Checks drawn on the mutual fund
account, however, impact the payment system, 20 4 a traditional bank
regulatory concern. The account raises investor protection concerns, a
traditional securities regulatory concern.
Last, the functional model lacks the flexibility to facilitate, or even
accommodate, evolutions in the substantive regulation of the banking
and the securities industry. It is an oversimplification to say that our
current substantive regulation of the banking and securities industry is
a matter, exclusively and respectively, of safety and soundness and
investor protection. The securities laws provide for safety and
soundness, and the banking laws provide for investor protection.
Functional regulation, however, tends to work best when regulatory
goals can be divided neatly along product lines.2"5 Again, if history is
203. For example, the OCC rules provide that the failure to comply with its securities offering
disclosure rules (the OCC's parallel to Securities Act registration) constitutes an unsafe or unsound banking
practice. Se 12 C.F.R. § 16.32(c) (1994). Although a bank's conduct with regard to the issuance of its own
shares would not be characterized as a traditional banking activity, it is one that the OCC deems important
to the bank's overall safety and soundness.
204. For a description of the payment system, see /naa note 225.
205. As discussed supra note 204 and accompanying text, traditional banking and securities products
raise many and, sometimes overlapping, regulatory issues.
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any indication of the future, it is likely that the traditional banking and
securities regulatory regimes will become more similar over time.2"6
Mutual fund assets have tripled since 1990, to $3.2 trillion in 1996,
easily outstripping the $2.6 trillion held in insured commercial bank
deposits.0 7 Much of the recent mutual fund growth is attributed to
individual retirement savings.2"8 Imagine the impact of the first major
mutual fund failure on our current system of regulation.
209  Will
investors, regulators, and lawmakers be satisfied with a system of
disclosure based regulation in the face of significant losses? In an era of
government downsizing, it is difficult to imagine that Congress would
move, in such an event, to adopt a system of federal insurance for
mutual fund deposits as it did in the face of the massive bank failures of
the 1930s. 211 Congress might, however, seek to impose greater safety
and soundness controls on the mutual fund industry.2 1
Alternatively, consider the future of bank regulation if disinter-
mediation continues. If dollars continue to move out of insured deposits
and into other financial vehicles, our costly system of regulating banks,
and the deposit insurance program, may no longer be justified.2 2
For similar reasons, institutional regulation is not a viable alternative
for the future. Institutional regulation relies on the premise that
different entities present distinct regulatory issues. This is not the case.
206. See infa notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
207. See GAO, Mutual Funds, supra note 3, at 3.
208. See id.
209. Of course, mutual funds do not suffer from the risk of runs that banks do principally because
of the liquidity of their assets. SeJONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND
REGULATION 55 (2d ed. 1997). Still, it is possible for a mutual fund to fail, particularly in the event of
misappropriation of assets or the like.
210. The industry, however, is showing signs of moving in that direction. Fidelity Investments and
Marsh & Mclnnan have both announced plans to offer shareholder insurance against loss due to default
on their money market mutual funds. M.B. Hart, Fdity Debuts Money Market Fund Insurance Plan, FUND
DIRECTIONS, Sept. 1996, at 1, 1.
211. In fact, one of the criticisms of some models of financial modernization is that relying on the
bank holding company structure for the expansion of banks' securities activities has the effect of imposing
safety and soundness regulation on non-banks. See Mark B. Sutton, Executive Vice President, Pain Webber
Group, Inc., Before the House Subcommittee on Finance and Hazardous Materials Financial Services
Restructuring (May 1, 1997).
212. Although there is litde current support for the complete elimination of federal deposit insurance,
proposals for reform of the structure are common. See generally R. Mark Williamson, Regulatory Thetmy and
Deposit Insurance Reform, 42 CLEV. ST. L REV. 105 (1994) (discussing and categorizing various theories of
deposit insurance reform). Congressman Tom Petri and bank consultant Bert Ely have structured a system
of cross guarantees that would eliminate federal deposit insurance. See Tom Petri & Bert Ely, Better Banking
for Am"eca The 100 Percent Cross-Guarantee Solution, COMMON SENSE: A REPUBLICANJOURNAL OF FACT
AND OPINION, Fall 1995; see also H.R. 4318, 104th Cong. (1996) (bill introduced by Congressman Petri
to implement the cross-guarantee approach). Even in the unlikely event that federal deposit insurance was
eliminated, banks would be subject to some other form of insolvency regulation. See inr'a notes 232-36 and
accompanying text.
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Even without liberalization of bank powers, a banking entity can engage
in activities that raise insurance fund issues (through its insured deposits)
and investor protection concerns (through its brokerage activities), just
as an individual activity can raise more than one regulatory concern." 3
B. Regulating Financial Risk: A Flexible, Focused Alternative
An approach better suited to the future of the banking industry must
focus directly on the risks that financial regulation was developed to
address. The goal of bank regulation is linked traditionally with the
safety and soundness of banking institutions. The goal of bank
regulation, however, can be more particularly and, perhaps, more
accurately," 4 defined as two-fold:" 5 the protection of the bank
insurance fund 6 and the protection of the financial system. Safety and
soundness is a means towards the end of stemming the risk to the bank
insurance fund and systemic risk.
Similarly, although the goal of the regulation of our securities industry
and markets is often couched in terms of investor protection, it can also
be viewed as a system that seeks to control the risk of fraud and abuse
in financial markets. 7 To the extent that "disclosure" is often used as
an icon for securities regulation, clearly, disclosure is only a means for
preventing fraud and abuse.
Focusing on these risks, rather than the means to address them,
provides a stronger foundation for an enduring regulatory regime.
Because the risks that our system seeks to regulate are not likely to vary
213. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
214. "Safety and soundness" as a label for the goal of bank regulation is perhaps misleading because
it suggests that the goal of bank regulation is to protect the solvency of individual banks. Although the
prevention of individual bank failure may be important for the protection of depositors, federal deposit
insurance addresses that concern. Therefore, our banking laws seek to protect against the risk of failure of
an individual bank only in cases where that bank's failure presents a systemic risk. For example, the only
exception to the requirement that the FDIC apply the "least cost test" to decisions regarding the resolution
of insolvent institutions involves cases in which the insolvency would have systemic implications. See supra
note 172.
215. To a lesser degree, but importantly, bank regulation has also addressed the risk of unfairness to
bank customers. For a general discussion of the goals of bank oversight, see generally GAO, GAO Bank
Orsight Stcture" US. and Fomgn E&peni May Offer Lssonsfor Modting US SuMture, GAO/GGD-97-23,
at 28 (Nov. 1996).
216. The protection of the bank insurance fund is one of the primary goals of bank regulation
because Congress has chosen to address the special risks associated with banking through the provision of
federally guaranteed deposit insurance. See discussion infra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
217. It is, I believe, more accurate to define the goal of securities regulation in terms of fraud and
abuse as opposed to investor protection because our substantive regulation has not always sought to
"protect" investors. Rather, our system has sometimes operated in a protective mode (e.g., by prohibiting
the sale of certain securities to non-accredited investors) and more often sought to provide a means for
consumers to protect themselves (e.g., by providing disclosure).
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over time,"' a regulatory model built around those risks can better
withstand the mutation of financial products and changes in the
character of financial organizations that are common today. The means
by which we address financial risks (i.e., our substantive laws) will and
should change.219 A regulatory model built around risk not only
anticipates changes in the marketplace, but can better accommodate
changes in substantive laws than our current model or pending reform
measures.
In sum, banks' securities activities conjure the following regulatory
risks: failure of the bank insurance fund, disruption of financial market
stability (including breakdown of the payment system), and unfairness
towards consumers (fraud and abuse). Consideration of these risks helps
address the questions of regulatory breadth, i.e., how far should our laws
reach, and regulatory division, i.e., what agency should be responsible
for administering the laws.
220
1. Regulatory Breadth
The debate over regulatory models usually centers on the question of
regulatory division.22' Yet, regulatory breadth, which focuses on the
substance of the laws regulating finance, is more vital to the ongoing
effectiveness of the regulatory regime. With banks' securities and
traditional activities as the primary focus, this subpart begins by
examining how our finance laws could be reformed under the risk based
model and identifies the fundamental challenges to such reform. This
subpart then considers, separately, each of the financial risks to be
regulated-insurance fund risk, systemic risk, and unfairness risk-and
profiles some of the particular challenges and innovations posed by
regulating those risks under the proposed model.
Traditionally, the debate concerning regulatory breadth has focused
on whether the federal securities laws should apply to banks' securities
activities in the same manner in which they apply to non-bank financial
firms.2 22 Under the functional approach, the answer was "yes." Under
218. Certainly the privatization of deposit insurance would eliminate the bank insurance fund risk.
See discussion supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
219. The growing use of the Internet for financial transactions may lead to more and more transfers
of wealth outside of our bank-based payment system. The regulatory risk will remain the same, but
regulation will have to venture beyond the banking channels that once contained that risk.
220. For discussion of similar proposals that focus on a "goals-oriented" approach to financial
regulation, see Ely, supra note 124; Wa//dman, supra note 124; Michael Taylor, "Twin Peaks": A Regultdovy
S.ructurefir the New Centus, CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION, Dec. 1995.
221. This is not surprising because the question of division determines regulatory power.
222. Scc supra Part III.B.I.
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the risk based model of regulation, both the question and the answer are
different fundamentally. Under the risk based approach, legislators
must identify first what risk the substantive law in question seeks to
address. If the answer is the risk of fraud and abuse (true, for most
provisions of the federal securities laws), then the question becomes
whether those laws need the breadth to cover banks' activities in order
to stem the risk of fraud and abuse. Therefore, if banks engage in
activities that involve the kind of fraud and abuse regulated under the
securities laws, those activities should be covered by the securities laws.
Similarly, if the substantive law in question seeks to protect the bank
insurance fund (as with most of the federal banking laws), the law must
be given the scope to control that risk. Therefore, if the activities of a
bank affiliate could cause a loss to the bank insurance fund, the laws
enacted to protect the fund must reach that activity, or impose the
necessary firewalls or other protections to ensure that those activities do
not create that risk.223
Although this analysis might appear to provide no more than a
different route to the same result reached under the functional
regulation model (i.e., application of the federal securities laws to banks'
securities activities and application of the banking laws to activities
affecting safety and soundness), a more particular analysis of the
question of regulatory breadth under the risk based model reveals
important differences from the functional model and challenges to our
substantive laws. The difference is that, under a risk based model, the
breadth of regulation is not determined by a classification of an activity
as a securities activity or a banking activity, or a determination of whether
the activity is conducted by a bank or a securities firm. Most of our laws
addressing financial risk are product- and entity-centric, drawing on the
functional and institutional models.224 Reforming laws so that they
address current and future risks requires foresight and, perhaps, heavy
reliance on administrative rulemaking to establish regulatory
parameters. We often see a lag in regulation when compared to the
223. The risk based model of regulation does not necessarily provide a neat answer to the debate over
whether securities activities must be housed in a bank affiliate as opposed to the bank itself or a bank
subsidiary. This controversy typically pits the OC (regulator of national banks and their subsidiaries)
against the Fed (regulator of bank affiliates and bank holding companies). &ee supra note 132 and
accompanying text. The model does suggest, however, that this issue revolves around the risk to be
regulated and the means necessary to contain those risks rather than the division of power between
agencies.
224. For example, the provisions of the Exchange Act hinge almost exclusively on the existence of
a transaction in a "security." Therefore, the regulatory protections under the Exchange Act are largely lost
when dealing with financial products other than securities. This is a functional approach to the drafting
of substantive law.
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products and services offered by our financial industry. This occurs
because our regulatory structure has generally been reactive to market
events, thus focusing on existing products and activities. Our regulatory
scheme is not proactive or centered on the risk to be regulated. For
example, the current regulation of our payment systems225 is
implemented through the regulation of banks. This made sense
historically because banks had control over the payment system. 226 With
the development of stored-value cards227 (issued by banks and non-
banks) and other forms of electronic cash,228 transfers of value occur
today outside of the bank-based payment system. Not only does this
mean that regulated banks are now competing with unregulated non-
banks in the market for these new products, but that these products,
when offered by non-banks, are not subject to regulation. 2 9 If our laws
addressed the risk to the payment system, rather than the entities
maintaining the system or products traditionally used in the system,
drastic reform would not be necessary in the face of continuing and
increasing technological advances.23 0
A risk based system of financial regulation would allow sufficient
flexibility to address changes in products and realignment of entities.
Yet, such flexibility creates a major challenge in terms of drawing the
appropriate boundaries of financial regulation. By eliminating the
225. The GAO described recently the term "payment system" as follows:
The general term payment system refers to a mechanism for the transfer of monetary value
and related information. Transfer of value can occur, for example, when a customer writes
a check to a company and the funds are then transferred from the customer's bank account
to the bank account of the company. Related information exchanged at the same time
might include the identification of the payee and the payor, bank account numbers, and the
date of payment.
GAO, Pymans, Clarance, and &emt" A Guide to the Systems, Risks, and Issues, GAO/GGD-97-73, at 2 (une
1997).
226. Payment by check still accounts for the largest volume of noncash payments in this country.
&eid. at93.
227. A stored-value card is a device that resembles a credit card, containing a magnetic strip or a
computer chip which stores information (those with computer chips are often referred to as "smart cards").
Electronic cash is stored on the stored-value card (the electronic cash is purchased with currency). A holder
of the stored-value card can use the card to make purchases from vendors willing to accept the electronic
cash as a form of payment. For the FDIC's position on whether stored-value cards may be considered
insured deposits, see Stored Value Cards, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,490 (FDIC 1996).
228. Electronic cash can also be stored on the hard drive of a computer.
229. See generay Michael A. Fixier, Note, CyberFsanc: RegulafiqgBani on the Internet, 47 CASEW.
RES. L REV. 81 (1996). State laws, however, may apply to the non-bank issuers as well. See id. at 161;
GAO, Payments, Ckearance, and Setlment, supra note 225, at 161.
230. Alternatively, the risk to the payment system could be contained, for example, by prohibiting
non-banks from issuing electronic forms of cash. This alternative is viewed by many as stifling unnecessarily
competition. See U.S. TREASURY, AN INTRODUCTION TO ELEcTRONIc MONEY ISSUES, 71 (1996)
(prepared for the U.S. Department of the Treasury Conference, Toward Electronic Money and Banking:
The Role of Government).
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current product- or entity-centric boundaries of our financial regulation,
other borders must be drawn. Refining the definition of the risk to be
regulated assists in creating workable boundaries. Our current system
of financial regulation employs, to a degree, this method of line drawing.
For example, under the federal securities laws, certain sophisticated
investors receive fewer protections than less sophisticated ones. One
way to rationalize this distinction is to conclude, as a policy matter, that
certain investors do not need, or perhaps merit, protection from the risk
of fraud and abuse. Arguably, this merely replaces product- or entity-
based regulation with customer- or investor-based regulation. Certainly,
if this method of refining the risk to be regulated were taken too far, our
financial regulation could be so driven by customer definition as to
create some of the same anachronisms that plague our current system.
2" l
Still, some amount of refining of risk on customer lines may avoid
overreaching and the certain obsolescence of the boundaries drawn on
the current product or entity lines.
More specifically, consideration of each of the three financial risks
identified above poses challenges to the substantive law that currently
seeks to regulate those risks. The bank insurance fund risk exists only
because Congress chose to address the particular risks faced by bank
depositors primarily through the creation of the federally guaranteed
bank insurance fund.232 Elimination of FDIC insurance seems
politically improbable and, perhaps, undesirable, but fundamental
reform of the system has received scholarly and industry support."' 3 If
federally guaranteed insurance is eliminated, the bank insurance fund
risk is eliminated. Under our current model of regulation, the
elimination of bank insurance fund risk might lead to alternative
regulation of the risk of bank insolvency. 3 4 Yet, as compared to the
other regulatory risk identified, this risk is entity specific, that is, the risk
231. For example, in the same way that the development of new products eludes regulation drawn
on product lines, the development of new vehicles for delivery of products to customers could elude
regulation drawn on customer lines.
232. As described by Professor Swire, prior to the creation of deposit insurance, "a bank failure posed
two sorts of threats to the local or national economy. First, depositors would lose access to their transaction
accounts-their checks would not clear, and they would in general lose the key benefit of'immediacy,' or
immediate access to their money." Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now That It Matters Again, 42 DUKE
Lj. 469, 490 (1992).
233. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. Notably, Canada, France, Germany,Japan and the
U.K. do not explicitly provide federally guaranteed deposit insurance. See GAO, Bank Oversht Structure,
supra note 215, at 67.
234. The elimination of FDIC insurance, however, would likely lead to the creation of private
insurance schemes. In that event, the government would certainly have in role in regulating private
insurers (which may include banks acting as self-insurers or insurers of other banks). See supra note 212
(citing a proposal for the elimination of federal deposit insurance and the creation of a cross-guarantee
system).
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of bank failure. Historically, bank failure risk was a key regulatory
concern because banks, by their nature, were more susceptible to failure.
In the future, banks may not hold a special risk of insolvency as they
diversify (assuming continued expansion of bank powers) and as demand
deposits decline as a percentage of their liabilities (assuming continued
disintermediation). If we view the banks of the future as firms that are
consolidated with securities and possibly other commercial firms, they
may not merit special regulatory treatment. At the same time, the
regulation of insolvency risk may be extended, to a degree, to the
consolidated financial services firm. This outcome becomes more
probable as more and more "small savers" invest their money in
nondeposit financial products.235 In sum, the regulation of insolvency
risk in the future may contract vis-A-vis bank-specific regulation and
expand vis-a-vis overall financial services wherein all financial services
firms will be subject to some, and the same, insolvency-risk regulation.2"6
Turning to the refinement of the systemic risk to be regulated,
attention must be given to the globalization of our financial markets.
Particularly given the growth in technology, the integrity of our financial
system can no longer be ensured within our borders. Reforming our
substantive laws to more directly and effectively regulate our payment
system, for example, will require international cooperation and
coordination. We cannot rely on the unilateral enforcement of domestic
laws to contain the systemic risk in a global financial marketplace.
Finally, refining the risk of unfairness highlights some of the public
policy choices made under our current substantive laws. For example,
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)237 offers an example of an
entity based law that seeks to address the unfairness associated with the
failure to provide credit services to low income neighborhoods.238 The
CRA mandates that the federal banking regulators encourage
depository institutions "to help meet the credit needs of the local
communities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and
sound operation of such institutions." '239 To the extent that the CRA
addresses lack of access to credit (as opposed to access to insured
deposits), it is not obvious why the law is entity-centric. The risk based
235. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text (discussing the potential regulatory consequences
of the first major mutual fund failure).
236. Michael Taylor's "Twin Peaks" proposals for the reform of the U.K.'s system for regulating
financial services combines protection of depositors, investors, and policy-holders into the consumer
protection peak of the model. See Taylor, supra note 220.
237. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (1994).
238. Segenea/yJonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Commnunity ReinwstmentAct An Economic
Analysis, 79 VA. L. REv. 291, 298-99 (1993).
239. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1994).
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focus suggests a broadening of the scope of the CRA to all lenders, not
just depository institutions.2 "° This illustrates how a risk based approach
to regulatory breadth effectively advances regulatory goals.
2. Regulatory Division
While the parameters of substantive law are important to the ultimate
regulation of financial risk, those laws must be administered under an
appropriate regulatory structure. Using banks' securities and traditional
activities as the focus, this subpart outlines how regulatory responsibility
would be best divided under the risk model. This subpart first addresses
that issue in theory, and then suggests how regulatory responsibility
would be divided in reality and in an attempt to preserve as much of the
current regulatory expertise and organizational structure as possible.
In the abstract, the issue of regulatory division is simple under the risk
model. Once the financial risks have been identified and the substantive
laws have been given the appropriate breadth to address those risks,
regulatory responsibility can be divided according to the risk regulated.
Thus, Congress would assign one agency responsibility for adriinistering
laws that address risk to the insurance fund, one for the laws that target
systemic risk, and one for the laws governing the risk of unfairness.
The main challenge to this division of regulatory responsibility is that
it creates a degree of agency overlap, although less than under our
current system.24' A major fraud involving a large bank's securities
activities could put the bank insurance fund, the financial system, and
fairness at risk. Under this system, therefore, all three agencies would
bear responsibility for preventing major fraud.242 This outcome is not
necessarily undesirable, because each agency would bring its experience
and its distinct regulatory goal to the task. For example, the systemic
risk regulator would address the issue of major fraud differently from the
bank insurance fund risk regulator.243
240. Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, recently proposed whether CRA-like
requirements should be imposed on non-bank financial institutions. See Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller
of the Currency, Remarks Before the Director's Roundtable in San Francisco, California, NR 97-65 (July
15, 1997). For a general discussion of the discriminatory impact of the Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA) on depository institutions, see Macey & Miller, supra note 238, at 312-18.
241. Se infra note 246-53 and accompanying text.
242. Under our current system, at least four agencies (the OCC, the Fed, the FDIC, and the SEC)
would be involved, assuming that this hypothetical bank is a national bank conducting its securities
activities through an affiliate.
243. The difficulty arising from the regulatory overlap which exists under our current system of
regulation is that not only do the respective jurisdictions of the regulators overlap, but each regulator is
serving, to a degree, the same goals--the securities regulator is attempting to provide for investor protection
as well as financial system stability and so are the banking regulators. Goal redundancy would not be at
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Combining one or more of the three agencies into a super-regulator
could eliminate agency overlap. Proposals for super-regulators, how-
ever, have been viewed with skepticism.2  The super-regulator
approach has been criticized because the combination of regulatory
responsibility for different goals might obscure the agencies' mission,
making it less efficient and effective.245 Moreover, the concentration of
regulatory power may be undesirable simply because it vests so much
power in one agency. For better or worse, banks have long influenced
regulation by playing one regulator off the other (state versus federal,
federal versus federal). The super-regulator approach would likely
transform the dance between banks and their regulators into a march
with the super-regulator at the lead. Finally, the super-regulator
approach might be dismissed on the basis of the disruption it would
cause to the current regulatory culture. Although this Article suggests
that the preservation of agency turf should not drive reform of our cur-
rent model of regulation, it does not advocate razing the existing regula-
tory community. Rather, it suggests that a model for reform should take
advantage of existing expertise when dividing regulatory responsibility.
The risk model of regulation could be implemented by redrawing
regulatory responsibilities among existing agencies as follows:2  The
risk to the bank insurance fund is sensibly assigned to the FDIC. The
FDIC possesses the expertise to perform this function because it is the
primary regulator for state non-member banks. This would expand
considerably the FDIC's jurisdiction, making it the primary federal
regulator (on bank insurance fund risk) for all banks offering FDIC
insured deposits.247 The FDIC would be responsible for administering
laws that relate to banks' safety and soundness because this is the
fundamental means of protecting the bank insurance fund under our
current system.
248
issue in the risk model.
244. The U.K.'s recent proposal to strip the Bank of England of its supervisory powers and vest such
authority with the Securities and Investments Board, which would have supervisory responsibility for
banking, securities, and insurance, has been the center of much debate and criticism. See oe.s the UK
&pernent Make Seunse, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (une 1997); Michael Taylor, Super-SIB Concept Too Conpkx
and Over-concentrates Power, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (June 4, 1997); Charles Goodhart & David Uewellyn,
A Blured Outlook THE FINANCIAL TIMES (May 30, 1997).
245. This criticism has been made regarding the U.K.'s proposed super-regulator. See Goodhart &
Uewellyn, supra note 244.
246. This Article does not seek to advocate the assignment of responsibilities to, or removal of power
from, any particular existing agency. The following serves only as an example of how the model could be
implemented with, perhaps, the least disruption to the current system.
247. This would remove safety and soundness responsibility from the Fed, the OCC, and the OTS.
248. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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In the spirit of preserving the current organizational structure, the
Fed would become the systemic risk regulator under the risk model
because the Fed currently bears the primary responsibility for systemic
risk. The responsibility for systemic risk, however, need not be assigned
to the central bank (the entity responsible for monetary policy).
Moreover, the Fed's role as the largest purveyor of payment services
creates a conflict of interest with its role as regulator of payment
systems. 9 Such designation, however, provides the Fed with access and
understanding which should assist with the implementation of monetary
policy. Under the risk model, the Fed would not only retain its systemic
risk responsibilities, but would also gain responsibility for regulating
transfer and clearing functions, currently regulated by the SEC and the
bank regulators. This redesignation would give the Fed more
comprehensive control over activities that pose a threat to the stability
of our financial markets.
The SEC, predictably, would be responsible for administering laws
that address the risk of unfairness in financial markets. This preserves
the SEC's fundamental function under the securities laws. In addition,
the SEC would acquire responsibility for consumer protection laws
currently administered by the bank regulators such as Truth In
Savings,25 the CRA,25' and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,252 to
name a few.
This division leaves the OCC and OTS without responsibilities other
than the chartering of national banks and national savings associations,
respectively. The FDIC could be given the authority to grant national
bank and savings associations charters.25 Alternatively, the federal bank
and savings association charter could be abandoned.
The OCC and the OTS reside within the Department of Treasury
(Treasury). This proposal, therefore, eliminates Treasury's role in bank
supervision. Treasury's ability to formulate economic policy might
suffer without some access to bank supervision. To alleviate this
249. &e GAO, Paymeas, Clearww, and Settem= supra note 225, at 168.
250. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4313 (1994).
251. S id §§ 2901-2907.
252. S& 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994).
253. Designating the FDIC as the federal chartering authority has efficiency benefits to the extent
that the FDIC already must evaluate a new institution for its eligibility for FDIC insurance. Currently,
separate application must be made to the FDIC in order to become an insured depository institution. See
12 U.S.C. § 1815(a)(1). In granting a national bank charter, however, the OCC must also certify to the
FDIC that it has considered the same factors as those considered by the FDIC in granting deposit
insurance. See id §§ 1814(b). The same is true regarding the Fed's decision to grant membership to a state-
chartered bank, i.e., the Fed must certify to the FDIC that it has considered the same factors as those
considered by the FDIC in granting deposit insurance. See id
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concern, Treasury could maintain its seat on the Board of Directors of
the FDIC.
In sum, the realignment of regulatory responsibility under the risk
model involves only one major institutional change--the elimination of
the federal chartering authorities. Otherwise, the model can be
implemented by maintaining the fundamental responsibilities of existing
agencies (the FDIC, the Fed, and the SEC) and reassigning the more
ancillary ones.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current paradigm of regulation of bank securities activities-the
functional equivalent of functional regulation-is an acceptable form of
regulation given the status quo. Current legislative proposals for reform
will not alter the current system to any notable extent. Our financial
marketplace is changing, however, and the current regime is not suited
to address such changes. Real reform-with a view to the future-will
require something more fundamental.
Divining the scope of financial regulation by the risk to be regulated,
rather than the entity or product providing a financial service, provides
greater flexibility in achieving regulatory goals in an environment in
which the character of entities and products continues to evolve.
Defining the breadth of regulation according to the risk to be regulated
allows for laws that are not made obsolete by market innovation. It also
provides for substantive laws more faithful to their ultimate goal (that is,
the abatement of a particular financial risk). Dividing regulatory
responsibility according to regulated risk leads to overlapping agency
jurisdiction (over products and activities), but not task (one financial risk
assigned to each). Agencies are assigned to one risk and given full
authority and responsibility for regulating that risk. Undue
concentration of agency power, and unnecessary disruption to our
current system, is avoided by dividing regulatory responsibility along
existing lines of expertise. At the same time, the number of federal
agencies responsible for financial risk is reduced--a significant factor in
an era of government reinvention.
Regulating risk, not function, would better prepare our system of
financial regulation for the consolidated, international, and
computerized financial institutions of the twenty-first century. The risk
model, however, may suffer from a lack of political appeal. Because the
model entails at least some losses of authority for each of the financial
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regulators,"' it may not satisfy the survival instincts of existing agencies.
Because the model calls for proactive substantive laws, it may threaten
members of an industry accustomed to reactive legislation. Similarly,
lawmakers confronted with an antiquated system of congressional
committee jurisdiction will perceive implementation of a risk based
model as a daunting task. Our lawmakers, therefore, must overcome
significant hurdles to chose reform that will outlast this century and
endure well into the next. The risk model can provide the foundation
for such reform.
254. The Fed might possibly perceive the risk based model as providing it with increased, or at least
equal, regulatory power to the extent that the model puts the Fed in charge of all systemic risk issues. Of
course, the Fed would lose its supervisory power over state member banks and bank holding companies to
the extent no systemic issues are involved. In addition, the risk model does not necessarily provide for the
placement of systemic risk responsibility with the central bank. See Jafa note 249 and accompanying text.
In this case, implementation of the model could include a decision to transfer the Fed's responsibility for
monetary policy to a different regulatory body.
